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Abstract 
The central question of my investigation is: how do artists present the unpresentable when 
presentation itself is impossible? Concentrating solely on Janet Cardiff and George Bures 
Miller’s artworks Opera For a Small Room (2005) and The Killing Machine (2007), I 
redevelop Jean François Lyotard’s concept of the sublime as put forth in his The Inhuman: 
Reflections on Time, in order to ask how Cardiff and Miller give shape to the unpresentable 
in their work. Opera and Killing are works that dynamically problematize and play with 
ideas of presentation, subjectivity, memory, and time. Thus, I explore my central question of 
presentation or present/presence outlined in my first chapter through three key themes: 
memory, time, and subjectivity, which correspond to chapters two, three, and four. I argue 
that Opera For a Small Room and The Killing Machine by Canadian installation artists Janet 
Cardiff and George Bures Miller answer this question of presentation by provoking us to 
experience the sensation of present/presence and enabling us to rethink the sublime as space 
without memory.   
 
 
Keywords 
Janet Cardiff, George Bures Miller, Lyotard, Kant, Sublime, Present, Presence, Memory, 
Temporality, Time, Subjectivity, Ontology.   
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Chapter 1   
Introduction: The Sublime and the Present/Presence  
Opera For a Small Room (fig.1) and The Killing Machine (fig.2) by Canadian 
installation artists Janet Cardiff and George Bures Miller are works that dynamically 
problematize and play with ideas of presentation, subjectivity, memory, and the 
despatialization of time. Concentrating solely on Cardiff and Miller’s 2013 exhibition 
Lost in the Memory Palace, which featured the two above works, I redevelop Jean 
François Lyotard’s concept of the sublime as presented in his The Inhuman: Reflections 
on Time, in order to ask how Cardiff and Miller give shape to the unpresentable in their 
work. If the postmodern paradigm represents a retreat from the notion of traditional 
metaphysics, where does this leave the sublime? As Lyotard frames the question: “As 
every presentation consists in the ‘forming’ of the matter of data, the disaster suffered by 
the imagination can be understood as the sign that the forms are not relevant to the 
sublime sentiment. But in that case, where does matter stand, if the forms are no longer 
there to make it presentable? How is it with presence?”1 In other words, following 
Lyotard, the question of this investigation becomes: how can we create an aesthetics of 
the sublime through material means when presentation itself is impossible? Cardiff and 
Miller’s artworks Opera for a Small Room and The Killing Machine answer this question 
by provoking us to experience the sensation of present/presence and enabling us to 
rethink the sublime as a space without memory.   
 
 
                                                
1Jean-François Lyotard, The Inhuman: Reflections on Time [1998], trans. Geoffrey Bennington and Rachel 
Bowlby (Standford California: Stanford University Press, 1991), 136.  
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Figure 1: “Opera For a Small Room,” Lost in the Memory Place, 2013, Janet Cardiff 
and George Bures Miller. Art Gallery of Ontario. 
 
Figure 2: “The Killing Machine,” Lost in the Memory Place, 2013, Janet Cardiff and George 
Bures Miller. Art Gallery of Ontario. 
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Configuring the aesthetics of memory through what I will discuss as a present-
absence and an absent-presence, Opera and Killing will be shown to expose slippages 
between that which can be presented but not represented. Investigating these slippages as 
an element of the sublime, resurrects questions of human experience in relation to the art 
object. The stakes of my enquiry are three-fold: i) to problematize the evocation of the 
sublime through memory as a (re)presentation of the unpresentable; ii) to examine the 
role of temporality in the sublime; and iii) to consider the consequences of the 
Cardiff/Miller works for subjective understandings of time and space.  
There has been ample academic scholarship describing Janet Cardiff’s solo works 
as well as her early collaborations with her partner Bures Miller—particularly The 
Paradise Institute, which was presented at the 2001 Venice Biennale. Currently, 
however, there is little academic writing that focuses on either The Killing Machine or 
Opera for a Small Room. The significance of the way in which these two Cardiff/Miller 
collaborations shift the illusionary experience for the viewer from one that relies on 
spatiality to one that functions in the realm of the temporal has yet to be explored. Of no 
less importance is the manner in which these multi-sensory works effect a destabilization 
of the viewing subject’s sense of self.  
When considered in terms of the Cardiff/Miller works, Lyotard’s notion of the 
inhuman undoes the ways in which the self has been traditionally situated in time and 
space. By introducing the inhuman as a new category, Lyotard attempts to put the 
historical in conversation with the aesthetic, using the sublime in order to articulate a 
space that exists outside of or beyond thought. The difficulty with this effort is systemic 
as the sublime is always already embedded within myths of origin and is therefore, 
always already historical. Consequently, Lyotard states, “…what if human beings, in 
humanism’s sense, were in the process of, constrained into, becoming inhuman (that’s the 
first part)? And (the second part), what if what is ‘proper’ to humankind were to be 
inhabited by the inhuman?”2 This harkening back to established, habitual notions of 
                                                
2 Ibid., 2.  
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origins and beginnings is what prevents the sublime from passing into the outside spaces 
Lyotard initially describes. In order to re-think the sublime as a mechanism, which can 
mobilize thought differently, we must re-think its possibilities in the contemporary 
aesthetic context. While Lyotard does look at examples of visual art, he focuses entirely 
on examples of a two-dimensional medium: painting. In looking at three-dimensional, 
multi-media and multi-sensory constructions, like those of Cardiff and Miller, Lyotard’s 
notion can be revived to invite an enquiry into how artists might begin to materially 
structure that which is deemed unpresentable. This wider interest deals with an expanded 
artistic and aesthetic context through which to look at the sublime. Central to this new 
context for the sublime is the notion of present/presence and absence.  
In her essay “How to Define Presence Effects: The Work of Janet Cardiff,” 
Josette Féral discusses presence in the work of this artist. Féral defines absent-presence as 
the “presence effect” a “feeling that the audience has that the bodies or objects they 
perceive are really there within the same space and timeframe,” even though “the 
spectators know they are not there. [emphasis added]”3 Féral’s investigation of presence 
looks at Cardiff’s solo works Forest Walk (1991) and Forty-part Motet (2001) as well as 
the Miller collaboration Paradise Institute. In order to bring her ideas into the context of 
The Killing Machine and Opera for a Small Room, we must re-evaluate Féral’s notion in 
terms of its implications for the sublime. Instead of the illusion of physically occupying 
space, Opera and Killing offer the understanding of presence through the notion of 
absence.  
Absent subjects occupy the time of the viewer without sharing their space because 
they are not materially present but set apart from the viewer through physical distance. It 
is important that in both works an objective distance is preserved: the viewer is presented 
with structures that allow access only at a distance. The result is that both Opera and 
Killing present visibly absent subjects. In Killing the victim strapped in the dental chair is 
missing in bodily form (fig.3) as is the man who is, according to the disjointed narrative 
                                                
3 Josette Féral, “How to Define Presence Effects: The Work of Janet Cardiff,” in Archaeologies of 
Presence (New York: Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group, 2012), 31.  
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of Opera’s soundscape, supposed to be sitting in a vacant chair in the center of the 
structure (fig.4 and fig.5). While the physical presence of both subjects is relayed through 
absence, their presence can be sensed as viewers identify with the man in Opera and feel 
the pain of the subject in the dental chair with Killing. They are spatial lies (phantoms), as 
they do not appear in physical space and thus present viewers with a temporally distorted 
construction of the subject. How can this spatial lie in Cardiff and Miller’s work be put in 
conversation with the sublime in Lyotard’s text? And to what end? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 3: "The Killing Machine." Detail. Dental chair. 
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Figure 4: "Opera For a Small Room." Interior view. 
Figure 5: "Opera For a Small Room." 
Detail. Interior with spotlighted chair. 
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In The Inhuman Lyotard discusses the idea of presence in relation to time through 
the paintings of Barnett Newman. In contrast to Féral’s idea of presence, Lyotard focuses 
on the temporal. He maintains that Newman’s work confronts viewers with the 
experience of time, which appears as a kind of instantaneous presence. He states, 
“Presence is the instant which interrupts the chaos of history and which recalls, or simply 
calls out that ‘there is’, even before that which is has any signification.”4 By maintaining 
the objective distance of the work, Opera and Killing engender moments of time wherein 
sublime difference occurs: they are events that exist between the delay in which an 
unstructured instant becomes a contemplated and integrated experience. One of the many 
ways Opera and Killing produce this delay is through the ways in which they constantly 
overload the viewer’s senses postponing their ability to unify and cognize this data. Here 
signification and recognition cannot account for the shear amount of sensory overload 
and thus come too late (this idea of reason arriving too late will be further explored in 
chapter four).   
For Lyotard, this brief fragment of time between complete immersion in the event 
and an awareness of its functionality as such—the moment before the instant is integrated 
and becomes meaningful—is the space of the Kantian sublime. Here Lyoytard uses 
Kant’s notion in order to illustrate the shift attributed to the postmodern that characterizes 
a difference in the perception of time: this is what he understands as the shift towards the 
inhuman. Lyotard’s use of Kant’s notion of the sublime in this paradigm largely functions 
as a means to capture something that he sees changing in progress, something that 
constantly eludes his grasp, much like the sublime or the present. This interplay between 
occurrence and signification is precisely what Opera and Killing play with. In describing 
Aristotle’s concept of time in Book IV of the Physics Lyotard states, “It is impossible to 
determine the difference between what has taken place (the proteron, the anterior) and 
what comes along (the husterion, the ulterior) without situating the flux of events with 
respect to a now. But it is no less impossible to grasp any such ‘now’ since, because it is 
                                                
4 Lyotard, The Inhuman, 87.  
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dragged away by what we call the flow of consciousness…”5 This particular passage 
highlights Lyotard’s acknowledgement of two things: 1) the fear of adhering to 
prescriptive and fixed meaning when delineating the difference between past, present and 
future, particularly in the historical sense, and 2) the sheer impossibility of such an 
endeavour as the task of grasping the “now” alludes to the ability to catch hold of 
something which consciousness prohibits. The first admission highlights the importance 
of Lyotard’s mobilization of Kant’s notion of the sublime as a characterization of a kind 
of middle ground, or non-prescriptive place, which denies myths of origin and 
teleological progress in historical discourse. While this first admission will be important 
in the discussion of temporality in regard to the issue of presence/present in Cardiff and 
Miller’s work, Lyotard’s second admission is our initial concern.  
This second admission, regarding the delay between the beginning of an event 
and its recognition as such, can be further elucidated by examining Brian Massumi’s 
characterization of the means by which the present is perceived in Parables for the 
Virtual: Movement, Affect, Sensation. In this text Massumi looks towards the missing 
half-second which exists between the beginning of an event, as it presents itself in brain 
activity, and its manifestation as an expression in the body.6 This half-second delay 
between event and recognition can also be seen as the pure present/presence of which 
Lyotard speaks. Massumi asserts that in the opening of an event, “Its newness means that 
[its] incipience cannot just be a conservation and reactivation of the past. They are 
tendencies – in other words, pastnesses opening directly onto a future, but with no present 
to speak of. For the present is lost with the missing half second, passing too quickly to be 
perceived, too quickly, actually, to have happened.”7 What Massumi points out in this 
example is that human perception functions as a constant jump between past and future: 
the moment that the present is recognized it becomes (re)cognized and thus becomes 
consumed in the past. This understanding of time indicates that the present cannot be 
                                                
5 Ibid., 24.  
6 Brian Massumi, Parables for the Virtual: Movement, Affect, Sensation (Durham and London: Duke 
University Press, 2002), 29. 
7 Ibid., 30. 
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situated within experience but must lie just outside of it. As we will explore in what 
follows, in prompting the encounter of multiple, overlapping, and continuously changing 
times, Opera and Killing play with this structure of occurrence and recognition by 
inviting the viewer to dwell in the present—the in-between now-ness of the event. 
As Lyotard maintains, a permanent presence outside of thought presupposes the 
impossibility of this existence for more than mere fragments of time, which is why the 
sublime itself is so ephemeral. In this way, the notion of pure presence/present through 
the perceptive mode of the sublime becomes limited in terms of what it can provide by 
way of the discourse of restructuring thought itself because it still very much relies on 
normative modes of spatiotemporal perception. This means that the inhuman is already 
implied within the human much as Lyotard argues that the postmodern is already implied 
within the modern. He asserts: “When this argument is applied to modernity, the result is 
identified and defined as clearly circumscribed historical entities, of which the latter 
would always come ‘after’ the former. Rather we have to say that the postmodern is 
always implied in the modern because of the fact that modernity, modern temporality, 
comprises in itself an impulsion to exceed itself into a state other than itself.”8 Like the 
postmodern and modern, humanity and inhumanity both reject and rely on each other in 
order to exist as categories of historical and aesthetic understanding. It is important to 
note that this push/pull relationship is one which Cardiff and Miller use in their work to 
affect difference through the absent-presence of the sublime. The in-between time and 
space of the inhuman or the sublime becomes problematic because the necessity to 
occupy the middle is undermined by the necessity to turn back towards experience. 
Massumi states,  “Something happening out of mind in a body directly absorbing its 
outside cannot exactly said to be experienced.”9 In this way, thought can never turn 
towards an entirely outside space, and while this is very much central to Lyotard’s 
project, it is limiting in terms of being able to restructure notions of the perception of 
time; seeing or perceiving differently can only occur in temporal fragments. However, 
perhaps this mode of brevity is the only means by which we can experience difference. If 
                                                
8 Lyotard, The Inhuman, 25.  
9 Massumi, Parables for the Virtual, 29.  
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the mode of difference is pure presence—the now—then it can only be experienced as 
something that exists outside for this fleeting moment before it becomes reinterpreted 
within experience.  This is precisely why the Cardiff/Miller artworks constantly pull the 
viewer into the work, immersing them in a present/presence and then bringing them back 
into signification: in order that they might effect a mode of difference. I identify that this 
particular aesthetic technique of immersion and recuperation constitutes the sublime.   
As previously outlined, the illustration of the sublime as an absent-presence in 
terms of the suspension of space and time indicates that it can only ever be used as a 
temporary reprieve that at once rejects and simultaneously relies on the structure from 
whence it came. This notion seems to be inconsistent with Lyotard’s claim in the 
introduction of his text: “I am not making this hypothesis about development my own, 
because it is a way, the way, for metaphysics, henceforth ruled out for thinking, to re-
establish its rights over it. To re-establish them not within thinking (if I make an 
exception of the thinking which still calls itself philosophical, which is to say 
metaphysical), but from the outside of thinking.”10 It is the case that the nature of the 
sublime as an absent-presence or pure presence/present in terms of the suspension of 
space and time indicates that it operates outside of experience. However, in order for an 
event to be characterized as sublime it must re-enter the realm of experience 
simultaneously operating both within and outside of thought. Lyotard’s inconsistency is 
intentional as it highlights the failure of the permanence of this state of difference. The 
very nature and mode of difference is that it can only be maintained for mere fragments 
of time before it is re-consumed within normative modes of experience.  
The fleeting quality of difference is exactly why Opera and Killing must 
constantly move the viewer through various states of subjectivity and various times, 
preventing the viewer from remaining in any one place: this constant movement and 
unsettling causes one to continually be confronted with instances of the present/presence 
or instances of difference. Thus, the category of the inhuman re-establishes the outside 
spaces of thought from within thinking rather than outside of it as Lyotard initially 
                                                
10 Lyotard, The Inhuman, 6.  
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suggests. This attempt to enter into the realm of the ungraspable through the sublime 
from the inside rather than outside of thought is seemingly very much in line with the rest 
of his subsequent arguments. However, the categories of within and outside rely, once 
again, on each other to exist and thus limit the ability of the sublime to reconfigure 
structures of narrative-based thought. Which is why in order to effect this difference, 
Opera and Killing must prevent the viewer from resolving and reconciling the aesthetic 
mode thus produced.   
Looking at these two works in the overall context of the show Lost in the Memory 
Palace the theme of absent-presence also converges with the aesthetic of memory as an 
overall consideration of this curatorial project. The stories that Killing and Opera (as well 
as all the other works in the exhibition) tell are stories that hinge on memory: memories 
that both belong to the viewer and are simultaneously external to them. They are 
memories of a fictive past that become an affective reality as the spectator engages with 
the work: their own memories converge with the fictitious ones, opening onto a unique 
and nonlinear future.  
Turning back to Féral’s essay will further elucidate this point as she states that 
experience is constituted both of “thought and memory.”11 She outlines the difference 
between the apparition of an object, as it appears in space, and the “idea of this object,” 
as it presents itself in the subject’s thought .12 This distinction is outlined by Kant in the 
Critique of Pure Reason as the difference between an intuition, as it appears to the 
senses, and the corresponding concept in the mind. He states, “Neither concepts without 
intuition corresponding to them in some way nor intuition without concepts can yield a 
cognition.”13 Neither sensory intuitions nor concepts can operate independently of the 
other as neither alone is enough to produce understanding. Opera and Killing point out 
this dependence through absence-presence by presenting sensory intuitions, which are 
                                                
11 Féral, “How to Define Presence Effects…”, 33.  
12 Ibid., 33.  
13 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason [1781, 1787], ed. and trans. Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood 
(Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1998), A50/B74. (hereafter cited in text as CPR) 
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discontinuous with each other. For example, in Killing viewers are confronted by a non-
present subject whose presence is sensed through the affective ritual killing that it 
undergoes. Here, the mind can conceptualize the absence of the subject through what is 
intuited by sense; however, viewers are still wont to feel bodily distress and empathy at 
the killing of another subject—even an absent-present one. This sensation is no doubt tied 
to the function of memory. While one may not have witnessed the torture of another 
being first-hand, the experience of pain is well known to most. These experiences of 
mundane acts, such as having dental work done, are the kinds of memories that are being 
conceptually evoked. This evocation in the mind of the viewer is what leads this work to 
have such a powerful, impact,and horrifying resonance. 
Lyotard synthesizes the function of memory nicely in his essay “Logos and Teche, 
or Telegraphy” from The Inhuman: “The synthesis of remembering implies not only the 
retention of the past in the present as present, but the synthesis of the past as such and its 
reactualization as past in the present (of consciousness).”14 The reactualization of the past 
in the present and its synthesis with the past as present is precisely the perpetual state in 
which viewers are placed with a work such as Opera. Viewers are pulled into the present 
of the work in Opera and Killing, but also into its fictitious past, while simultaneously 
being reminded of their own past and existing in their own present as a body in a physical 
space. Never allowing them to remain in any one time for more than moments, Opera 
and Killing once again shuttle the viewer back from recognition and integration into the 
now.   
In order to understand the inclusion of the sublime in Lyotard’s project and its 
function in Cardiff and Miller’s work as a confrontation with the present or the now, it is 
first necessary to explore the notion of the sublime as pure presence/present through 
Kant’s transcendental categories of space and time and their relationship to appearance. 
Kant’s system in CPR attempts to account for the means by which the external world 
appears to, and is cognized by, humans in the particular way that it is. Thus, the question 
                                                
14 Lyotard, “Logos and Teche, or Telegraphy” in The Inhuman, 51.  
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of the first critique is: How is Nature Possible?15 Kant’s project in the CPR aims to 
bridge together notions of empiricism and rationalism through the doubleness of 
subjective (inner sense) in cognition and objective (outer sense) in experience, both of 
which are understood through the transcendental categories of space and time. The 
introduction of the transcendental categories of space and time allow for the situation of 
the subject’s very mode of perception in the realm of the spatiotemporal. Thus, all 
experience and understanding is then thought through the co-ordinates of space and time 
and these must exist a priori.16 This is why Kant wants to “detach from the latter 
everything that belongs to sensation, so that nothing remains except pure intuition and the 
mere form of appearances, which is the only thing that sensibility can make available a 
priori. In this investigation it will be found that there are two pure forms of sensible 
intuition as principles of a priori cognition, namely space and time.”17 In labeling space 
and time the only two pure forms of sensible intuition Kant grounds the physical world in 
the transcendental, positioning all cognition, sensory or otherwise, in the transcendental 
categories. By demonstrating the malleability of these categories and highlighting their 
constructed nature with respect to the system of recognition and integration outlined 
earlier, Opera and Killing raise questions about issues of representation.  
Later in the CPR Kant outlines the issue with representation in regard to the 
transcendental category of time. He repeats that:  
Space itself, however, together with time, and, with both, all appearances, are not 
things, but rather nothing but representations, and they cannot exist at all outside 
our mind; and even the inner and sensible intuition of our mind (as an object of 
consciousness), the determination of which through the succession of different 
states is represented in time, is not the real self as it exists in itself, or the 
transcendental subject, but only an appearance of this to us unknown being, which 
was given to sensibility (bolded in the original).18  
                                                
15 This is the question that appears as the title of Daniel N. Robinson’s book How is Nature Possible?: 
Kant’s project in the First Critique (New York: Continuum Books, 2012). 
16 Ibid., 35.  
17 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A22.  
18 Ibid., A492. 
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The suggestion here is that space and time as categories are not things but make 
themselves apparent through processes of representation or appearance. In regard to the 
self specifically, and all noumena, the reason Kant gives for the knowledge of 
phenomena (this distinction will be explored in depth momentarily) only follows in the 
second half of the above passage: “The existence of this inner appearance as a thing thus 
existing in itself, cannot be admitted, because its condition is time, which cannot be a 
determination of any thing in itself. In space and time, however, the empirical truth of 
appearances is satisfactorily secured, and sufficiently distinguished.”19 The self as it 
exists in-itself, as with other noumena, is conditioned as a product of time. Therefore, in a 
world of constant flux and perpetual change the subject must ground experience in time, 
through the co-ordinate of space. As Daniel N. Robinson author of How is Nature 
Possible? Kant’s Problem in the First Critique suggests, “experiences could only be mine 
if space is granted as a necessary a priori intuition through which the permanent in outer 
space stand as the necessary condition for recognizing myself as an enduring subject of 
experience. Absent this, there is ‘experience’ but not known by me to be my experience, 
for there is no known enduring ‘I’ in which the appearance inheres.”20 In order for the 
subject or consciousness to operate, there must be the coherence of appearance in a self 
or an “I”, which must see itself in time as an object of its own perception, as well as a 
subject, in order for it to appear to function as a particular and distinct human entity to 
itself. In regard to the Cardiff/Miller artworks, this powerfully demonstrates why they 
effect a confusion of various subjective states (observer, witness, participant and 
eavesdropper, as will be explained further in chapter four) so that they might point to the 
constructed nature of the subject. Absent is the viewer’s ability to ground her/himself in a 
particular time or a particular state; the distinction between subject and object, viewer and 
artwork, is seemingly collapsed.  
Kant’s endeavour in the CPR is to account for the how of human experience and 
cognition. In contrast, Lyotard uses the sublime to bridge together a shift he observes in 
his historical moment between the human and inhuman: a tending towards a state of 
                                                
19 Ibid., A492.  
20 Robinson, How is Nature Possible?, 161.  
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inhumanity, an attempt to account for the when and where. In troubling these notions of 
when (time) and where (space), Opera and Killing preserve the objective distance of the 
work and, in doing so, pull the viewer into the time of work: pushing them into present, 
past, future and non-existent experiences in order to engage this time of difference. 
Rather than presenting viewers with an environment that impinges on their own space, 
Opera and Killing are closed-off structures through which viewers are granted access to 
the work at a physical distance only. Even with Killing where viewers participate, 
initiating the mechanism by pressing a button, they are still set at a physical distance 
from the structure itself (fig.6). This technique is reversed in Cardiff/Miller’s earlier 
work Paradise Institute, which draws the viewer into a physically immersive space by 
producing an environmentally accurate and familiar experience of theatre.  
 
 
Figure 6: "The Killing Machine." View from the gallery entrance. 
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In drawing out the difference between distance and immersion as visual 
techniques, Lyotard demarcates a helpful shift that captures a change in the aesthetic 
experience of the sublime historically. The shift I am referring to speaks to the reversal of 
distance in Cardiff/Miller’s work and rests on Lyotard’s emphasis on the concept of 
event-bound time. Here, Lyotard describes a shift in Baroque and Renaissance art from 
understanding the sublime as a transgression of space, to the contemporary moment, 
which presents an event-bound time of the sublime.21 With a work like Paradise Institute 
(fig.7 and fig.8) viewers are drawn into the sublime experience through total immersion, 
which transgresses space from the inside out. While the viewer may be confused or 
disoriented in terms of where certain sounds or voices are coming from in space, they 
maintain their autonomy as a subject throughout the duration of the piece because 
Cardiff’s whispering voice often addresses them directly. Spatially, the viewer may lose a 
sense of their whereabouts as they are engulfed in the environment but temporally they 
remain an unchanged “I”. Conversely, with Opera and Killing viewers are distanced 
physically but temporally engaged as a spectator of events, which are at once their own 
and also apart from them. This confuses the viewer’s own subjective experience with the 
subject’s experience in the work—confronting them with an event-bound time.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
21 Lyotard, The Inhuman, 85.  
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Figure 7: "The Paradise Institute," Janet Cardiff and George Bures Miller, 2001. 
Exterior view. From 
http://www.cardiffmiller.com/artworks/inst/paradise_institute.html#. 
Figure 8: "The Paradise Institute." Interior view. From 
http://www.cardiffmiller.com/artworks/inst/paradise_institute.html# 
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Thus, the nature of Lyotard’s endeavor is not a question of reflecting on time or 
even in time, but becomes a question of the very nature of time itself as a category of 
human understanding and a mode of maintaining difference. The suggestion of 
reflections on or in time in his subtitle relies on the assumption that space and time are 
always necessarily connected as mechanisms structuring knowledge and experience. 
Rather, to perceive in a mode of pure presence/present is to deny the relationship of time 
and space in order to perceive time itself as a constant passing, which is why it can only 
persist for mere fragments. The Cardiff/Miller artworks, Killing and Opera, offer an 
opportunity to engage perception so as to maintain this time of difference in multiple 
short intervals. Although these artworks are both durational (Killing is five minutes and 
Opera twenty) Cardiff and Miller pre-empt this experience of duration through instances 
of the sublime, which carry the viewer away from signification and into present/presence 
and vice versa. Thus, these artworks open up the present time and historical modes of 
narrating understanding through linear time (i.e. past, present, and future) questioning not 
where the human is but when they are. In looking back to Lyotard’s work in order to 
perceive or aestheticize time differently, Opera and Killing allow for a revisioning of 
historical modes of understanding in terms of the way the subject sees and is seen.  
In order to further elucidate the dissolution of subjective modes in Opera and 
Killing, it will be helpful to work from Lyotard’s concept of the inhuman as the entity 
that bears witness to a space without memory. To begin to wrestle with Lyotard’s 
position on subjectivity entails a return to Kant, whose traditional notion of the subject 
relies on the distinction between the world as it appears (phenomena) and the world as it 
is (noumena). Here, Kant poses his solution to the problem of representation. What Kant 
makes clear is that although things-in-themselves or noumena exist, all that the subject 
has access to is what can be perceived through the senses—the phenomena or that which 
appears. As Arthur Collins explains in his book Possible Experience: Understanding 
Kant’s “Critique of Pure Reason”: 
Although Kant thinks that philosophers suffer from the illusion that they 
can make defensible judgments that characterize things-in-themselves, the 
very existence of things-in-themselves is no illusion according to him. On 
the contrary, he says there are certainly such things, and that the existence 
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of appearances entails the existence of things-in-themselves, although we 
can attain knowledge of only the appearances.22 
 According to Collins’ reading, although the thing-in-itself or phenomena is most 
certainly contained in the noumena, it is not something that the perceiver can intuit or 
have access to through the senses or through reason. Rather, all that is available are 
things as they appear, regardless of the fact that thinking through things as they appear 
necessitates the existence of things-in-themselves. The connection between noumena, or 
things-in-themselves, and phenomena, the realm of appearances, also characterizes the 
relationship between the subject and self-understanding in Kant’s terms. The 
Cardiff/Miller artworks trouble this relationship through the ways in which they allow the 
subject to perceive itself as a product of time or present/presence.  
Therefore as one might expect this particular distinction between noumena and 
phenomena and its relationship to the subject and the self becomes important in chapters 
three and four for the manner in which it will allow me to work through the specific kinds 
of perception activated by Opera and Killing. In Kant’s critique, a purely empirical 
model for understanding accounts for neither: 1) the means by which experiences can be 
unified together as a continuity in consciousness, and 2) how these experiences can be 
unified as belonging to a particular self.23 According to Robinson, Kant must establish 
how particular thoughts can be that of a someone without adopting Cartesianism, for, 
bereft of the unity of various representations, the subject would have no way of 
harmonizing sensible intuitions into a concept at all.24 This unifying force is, of course, 
self-consciousness and must exist a priori in order for thought itself to be possible. Kant 
sets out the problem:  
But how the I that I think is to differ from the I that intuits itself (for I can 
represent other kinds of intuition as at least possible) and yet be identical with the 
latter as the same subject, how therefore I can say that I as intelligence and 
thinking subject cognize my self as an object that is thought, insofar as I am also 
                                                
22 Arthur W. Collins, Possible Experience: Understanding Kant’s “Critique of Pure Reason” (Los 
Angeles: University of California Press, 1999), 27.  
23 Robinson, How is Nature Possible, 151.  
24 Ibid., 152.  
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given to myself in intuition, only, like other phenomena, not as I am for the 
understanding but rather as I appear to myself, this is no more or less difficult 
than how I can be an object for myself in general and indeed one of intuition and 
inner perceptions (bolded in the original).25  
What is made clear in this passage is that in order for the subject to be able to think itself, 
the subject must also appear to itself as an object. Due to the relationship between self 
and the objects of the external world—in that all that can be known by the subject is 
appearances or phenomena, not things-in-themselves or noumena—the self as an object 
of its own perception cannot be known to the self as it is, but rather as it appears. The 
separation of realms (noumenal and phenomenal) in this model presupposes a kind of 
dichotomy between the subject and the world of objects or appearances.  
In creating an intrusion on the subject/object dichotomy, which operates such that 
it is fundamental to the subject’s experience of self and self-consciousness, Cardiff and 
Miller’s works call into question Kant’s link between representation, or appearance, and 
the self. In regard to consciousness, unless the subject can perceive itself as an object of 
appearance, the subject will have no means by which to unite experience. In the words of 
Robinson, “What is clear is that knowledge of oneself is not different from knowledge of 
objects, for in both instances knowledge requires representations of what is present in the 
form of appearances.”26 Separating empiricism from a rationalist framework necessarily 
means that “nothing about objects could be known a priori, not even their externality. 
There would be no basis on which to separate successive events in time nor could such 
objects be located in space, for neither time nor space is a “given” property of stimuli.”27 
So, not only would there be no verification of the world as external in the first place, but 
there would be no way to grant understanding of this world because it does not provide a 
mode of discovering the relationality of such a world: enter solipsism. This also functions 
at the level of the self: the independent perception of the self as both an object and a 
subject allows self-consciousness to operate as the means by which experience can be 
united.  
                                                
25 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, B155.  
26 Robinson, How is Nature Possible?, 163.  
27 Robinson, How is Nature Possible?, 35.  
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The irresolvability of the Cardiff/Miller works and ways in which they play with 
the subjective modes of eavesdropper, witness, and participant—often allowing the 
viewer to occupy all three positions simultaneously—is a means to circumvent the 
subject/object dichotomy that is created in Kant’s system. First, the viewer can be seen as 
taking on the role of the eavesdropper; as Tina Rigby Hanssen asserts about The Paradise 
Institute, “Eavesdropping, then, has much in common with the invasion of privacy.”28 In 
both Opera and Killing the audience takes part in this eavesdropping process as they get 
the impression that they are privy to events they are not meant to see, or which are private 
in nature. Christy Lange, author of the essay “Opera For a Small Room, 2005: The 
Impossibilists,” describes the space of Opera “as an elaborate amplifier for the 
albums…they composed the opera to provide the room’s soundtrack: a twenty-minute 
opus of samples from the records, narrated and mixed by a man we never see.”29 In this 
way, viewers are given entry into a space, which is personal and private, and they become 
eavesdroppers on a situation that is, and is not, meant for their witnessing. The audience 
peers into the sides of Opera’s wooden structure as though peering into a neighbor’s 
wooden shed, watching a scene in which a man privately listens to records and 
reminisces about his life (fig.9). Yet, the stage-like setup of the window in the front and 
the spectacular sound and light show that follows suggests that the viewer’s position as a 
subject eavesdropping on an object has been compromised. The viewer is an 
eavesdropper, a witness, and most importantly, a participant (as will be discussed in 
further detail in chapter four).  
 
 
                                                
28 Tina Rigby Hanssen, "The Whispering Voice: Materiality, Aural Qualities and the Reconstruction of 
Memories in the Works of Janet Cardiff and George Bures Miller," Sound Music and the Moving Image 
(Vol. 4, 2010): 45.  
29 Christy Lange, “‘Opera For a Small Room, 2005: The Impossibilists,” in The Killing Machine and Other 
Stories, eds. Ralf Beil and Bartomeu Marí (Darmstadt: Hatje Cantz Verlag, 2007), 175. 
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In The Killing Machine viewers are also confronted with an event that is not 
meant for public viewing. Approaching this makeshift wooden and mechanical torture 
structure with robotic arms poised above a dental-chair-like apparatus and a spectator’s 
chair in front, the audience recognizes the privacy of this scene (fig.10). Playing the role 
of an accidental infiltrator on a basement torture scene or underground government 
operation, the viewer in Killing becomes an eavesdropper but also a witness and a direct 
participant. Paige McGinley begins to address this interplay in her essay on the 
Cardiff/Miller work Cabin Fever (2004) (fig.11 and fig.12), in which the audience, 
looking onto a miniature diorama of a house, is privy to a scene of domestic violence 
through an audio track. McGinley argues:  
What is most striking about Cabin Fever is that, to this day, I am unable to 
determine whether or not the visual image of the diorama changed before my eyes 
with the unfolding of the narrative…On an intellectual level, I feel certain that the 
answer to these questions is “no”…But the synesthesia of my experience begs the 
Figure 9: "Opera For a Small Room." 
Detail. Rear view from window. 
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question: what did I see here? In fact, I saw nothing. Which makes me somehow, 
not a witness to a crime. Not a witness, nor a voyeur, I am an eavesdropper 
only…30  
In The Killing Machine the viewer is an eavesdropper but they are also a witness to a 
crime, which although felt, has no actuality. Additionally, because Killing requires an 
individual to switch on the mechanism, the viewer is also a participant—directly 
implicated in this fictional crime. Rather than maintaining a static relationship between 
the viewing subject and the work as an object, the viewer is moved through various 
subjective conditions that reveal the constructed nature of traditional notions of 
subjectivity and objectivity, as discussed by Kant.  
                                                
30 Paige McGinley, “Eavesdropping, Surveillance, and Sound. Janet Cardiff and George Bures Miller 
‘Cabin fever’,” A Journal of Performance Art 28, no. 1 (January 2006): 54.  
Figure 10: "The Killing Machine." Detail. Desk and spectator’s chair with dental chair and robotic 
arms in the background. 
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Figure 11: "Cabin Fever," Janet Cardiff and George Bures Miller, 2004. 
Exterior view. From 
http://www.cardiffmiller.com/artworks/smaller_works/cabinfever.html#. 
Figure 12: "Cabin Fever," Cardiff and  Miller. From 
http://www.cardiffmiller.com/artworks/smaller_works/cabinfever.html#. 
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As stated earlier in what follows I will explore the evocation of the sublime 
through the notion of absent-presence/present-absence in regard to three themes: 
memory, temporality, and subjectivity, thereby allowing us to rethink the sublime as a 
space without memory. In chapter two I explore the evocation of the sublime through the 
use of memory in Opera and Killing and its consequences in terms of representation and 
presentation. In order to do this I focus on the discontinuity between auditory and visual 
sensations in the work of Opera and Killing as well as their evocation of cultural 
memory. In chapter three I examine how, in challenging traditional notions of 
subjectivity and objectivity through present/presence, Opera and Killing allow us to see 
subjectivity as a temporal construction. By producing the effect of the despatialization of 
time, these works present viewers with a space without memory. Then, in chapter four, I 
consider how in allowing the viewer to become the inhuman, or the entity that bears 
witness to a space without memory, Cardiff and Miller’s works explore the ontological 
significance of the contemporary sublime.  
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Chapter 2  
Presenting the Unpresentable: Memory, 
Representation, and Presentation  
In this chapter I explore the relationship between representation and presentation 
through memory and the postmodern sublime as put forth by Lyotard. Looking at the 
ways in which memory functions with (re)presentation in terms of the imagination, I 
demonstrate how, in offering us memory without history, The Killing Machine and Opera 
for a Small Room  circumvent the nostalgic return of the modern Kantian sublime to 
figure as spaces without memory (an idea that I develop further as we move through this 
chapter).  
As we saw in chapter one, due to the irreconcilable and ineffable quality of the 
sublime, twentieth century scholars have taken up the Kantian sublime as that which 
operates outside of thought—as a gesture towards the ungraspable. This particular 
reading of the Kantian sublime, which is also taken up by Lyotard, understands that the 
sublime can only be present, or become apparent, through its very inability to be present-
ed. Thus, if the sublime can only be presented as an absence, it can only be spoken of in 
the negative: as an absent-presence or a present-absence. As already noted Lyotard 
defines the sublime as that which is unpresentable. To further elaborate Lyotard’s ideas, 
although, the sublime cannot be positively presented as possible itself (represented), it 
can be negatively presented as an absent possibility or a pure present/presence.  
The nature of this negative is not a kind of nothingness or nihilism but “merely 
the demonstration of inanity of the demand that the absolute be presented.”31 In other 
words, the desire to present the sublime is ultimately foolish; the sublime is something 
which cannot be presented but which is arrived at and comes into being through the 
acknowledgement that there is something not given or is absent in presentation. The 
absent-presence of the sublime can be further illustrated through an example given by 
                                                
31 Jean-François Lyotard, Lessons on the Analytic of the Sublime [1991], trans. Elizabeth Rottenberg 
(Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1994), 152. 
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Philip Shaw in The Sublime: the New Critical Idiom wherein contemplating the stars, the 
mind understands the universe as infinitely great.32 This concept of infinity33 is one that 
the mind fails to represent and as such this moment becomes sublime.34 The absolute or 
the infinite, as with the example of the stars, present themselves to us as a kind of 
absence as they are not present spatially, but temporally, in the mind of the perceiver who 
recognizes the possibility of their existence. As we looked at in chapter one, 
Cardiff/Miller’s Opera and Killing provide us with a place to stand in contemplation. 
Like the stars their possibility is infinitely great and as I will go on to show it is 
intimately tied to human memory and its limitations.  
When thinking about the place of the imagination it must be said that normally in 
observing an object, the imagination serves the function of synthesis: it joins together 
sensory intuitions and concepts in order to produce understanding.35 However, in order to 
engender the sublime, Opera and Killing are works which, rather than a synthesis, 
produce a conflict between the imagination and reason. Rather than an agreement 
between the imagination and understanding, the judgment of the sublime articulates an 
agreement between the imagination and reason.36 Confronted with its own limitations in 
the wake of the Idea, the imagination fails to present its intended content to the faculty of 
understanding: “In excluding itself from its own limits of presentation, the imagination 
suggests the presence of what it cannot present.”37 Thus, the accordance or agreement 
between reason and the imagination is an accordance of discord that reveals something 
outside of, or beyond thought. Lyotard explains further that this threat to self-preservation 
or normative structures of thought such as language, subject/object etc. produces a terror 
                                                
32 Philip Shaw, The Sublime: the New Critical Idiom (New York: Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group, 
2006), 80. 
33 Kant distinguishes between two forms of the sublime: dynamic and mathematical. In Giles Deleuze’s 
reading put forth in Kant’s Critical Philosophy: The Doctrine of the Faculties, the mathematical sublime 
has to do with immensity and the dynamic sublime has to do with power. This would make the concept of 
infinity related to the mathematical sublime rather than the dynamic.  
34 Shaw, The Sublime, 80. 
35 Sebastian Gardner, Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Kant and the Critique of Pure Reason (New 
York: Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group, 1999), 138-139.  
36 Giles Deleuze, “The Idea of Genesis in Kant’s Esthetics,” in Desert Islands and Other Texts, ed. David 
Lapoujade  trans. Michael Taormina (New York, NY: Semiotext(e), 2004), 61.  
37 Lyotard, Lessons on the Analytic of the Sublime, 152. 
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that devoid of these structures one will be consumed in a chasm of nothingness.38 
However, the sublime experience does not subject one to complete nihilism but takes 
them to the brink before returning them: “What is sublime is the feeling that something 
will happen, despite everything, within this threatening void, that something will take 
‘place’ and will announce that everything is not over. That place is mere ‘here’, the most 
minimal occurrence.”39 Presenting us first with a threat to normalcy through difference, 
the sublime also manifests itself as a kind of recovery from the void, bringing one back 
into cognition. Here, the loss or violence that the imagination undergoes in failing to 
represent its object to reason, becomes sublime and also ceases to be sublime at the 
moment of recuperation; thus, the sublime is both within and outside experience. The 
Cardiff/Miller works rehearse this movement from the sublime to recuperation and back 
again.  
 In the Critique of the Power of Judgment Kant is clear that the sublime represents 
not a harmonious agreement between reason and the imagination but rather relies on a 
paradoxical tension produced by the discovery of the imagination’s limit: pain to produce 
pleasure.40 This confrontation figures as painful pleasure as reason forces the imagination 
to unleash itself from its own constraints and encounter what it is incapable of 
reconciling. The question for us here is: how can this painful pleasure, created through 
the imagination’s limit, relate to the notion of memory?  
While Kant does not write about it specifically, memory is implied in two of the 
syntheses of the imagination: the synthesis of apprehension, and the synthesis of 
recognition. In order to arrange experience, whose condition is that of inner sense or 
time, into a narrativized sequence, one would have to rely on memory, implying this as a 
function of the imagination whose purpose is to represent objects of thought to the 
understanding. Like the sublime, memory (as tied to the process of remembering) 
involves the evocation of an event, thought, object, sensation etc. that is present 
                                                
38 Lyotard, The Inhuman, 84.  
39 Ibid., 84.  
40 Deleuze, “The Idea of Genesis in Kant’s Esthetics”, 61-62.  
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temporally but not spatially. Simply put, memory is often seen as a representation of the 
unpresentable or a representation of that, which is not present. The problematic nature of 
this idea of the relationship between memory and the sublime can be brought to light in 
the distinction between the sublime’s modern and postmodern forms. According to Seth 
Kim-Cohen, author of In the Blink of an Ear: Toward a Noncochlear Sound Art, the 
distinction between the modern and the postmodern sublime can be drawn out through 
the idea of nostalgia. He states, “For Lyotard, this modern sublime is nostalgic because it 
yearns for something missing: something lost or not yet attained.”41 Kim-Cohen argues 
that the modern sublime occupies this space of loss with that which has been deemed 
unpresentable.42 By contrast, Kim-Cohen quotes Lyotard who states that the postmodern 
sublime “puts forward the unpresentable in presentation itself.”43 This distinction 
between the modern and the postmodern forms of the sublime is therefore a question of 
representation versus presentation. If the modern period characterizes the sublime as 
always desiring something lost, then in the modern sublime memory is a representation of 
the unpresentable. Considering this, how would it be possible to look at artworks that 
deal with memory in the context of the postmodern sublime? In order to effect this shift 
the postmodern sublime would need to see memory as a presentation of the 
unpresentable. Cardiff and Miller create works which rely on memory. However, rather 
than falling into the modernist trap that Kim-Cohen outlines, their works Opera for a 
Small Room and The Killing Machine “present the unpresentable in presentation”44 
through the way in which they present memories that do not carry forward their history, 
hence memories without a history or space without a memory. In doing so, they present 
that which is unpresentable as they constantly pull the viewer back and forth between the 
present/presence (the now) and processes of cognition/signification.  
                                                
41 Seth Kim-Cohen, In the Blink of an Ear: Toward a Noncochlear Sound Art (New York: The Continuum 
International Publishing Group Inc., 2009), 219.  
42 Ibid., 220.  
43 Ibid., 220.  
44 Although this is awkward phrasing, this understanding is adapted from Lyotard (see n.43) and is crucial 
to understanding the distinction between the modern and postmodern sublime.  
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Opera and Killing illustrate the disconnect between memory and consciousness 
(train of thought) by presenting viewers with an experience that appears to both of these 
faculties in a discontinuous way. Both of these works present events without memories, 
or more properly, events without actual memories. The memories that Opera and Killing 
engage are ones that belong to the viewer, as well as to the absent-present fictional 
subjects in the works, and as such, hinge on both fiction and actuality. However, rather 
than allowing the viewer to get swept up into their storyline completely, Opera and 
Killing provide moments wherein the viewer is pulled back from the present/presence 
into a recuperation of sublime experience. Entering the environment of Opera viewers 
approach a wooden cube structure with a window (or stage) that opens onto a room in 
which an empty chair sits spotlighted and surrounded by old records, three turn tables, 
and various speakers/radios; a chandelier hangs from the ceiling and a giant red rug 
covers the floor (fig.13). The piece, which is on loop, begins with a man’s voice, 
projected from the central megaphone speaker (positioned above the chair), telling the 
story of a man who sits in a room surrounded by records (fig.14). As viewers listen, the 
turntables become engaged and play what are presumably records in the room. These 
audio tracks are layered on top of one another and mixed according to a disjointed 
narrative—as told by this male voice. The songs are then projected from different 
speakers around the room and synchronized with colored lights to create a moving light 
and sound orchestra (fig.15 and fig.16). In this way, viewers are given entry into a space, 
which is personal and private, and they become eavesdroppers on a situation that is, and 
is not, meant for their witnessing. The audience peers into the sides of Opera’s wooden 
structure as though peering into a neighbor’s wooden shed, watching a scene in which a 
man privately listens to records and reminisces about his life. 
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Figure 13: "Opera For a Small Room." Detail. First turntable and records. 
Figure 14: "Opera For a Small Room." Detail. Megaphone close-up. 
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Figure 16: "Opera For a Small Room." Detail. Sound and moving lights, frame one. 
Figure 15: "Opera For a Small Room." Detail. Sound and moving lights, frame two. 
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One of the ways Opera avoids the tendency towards nostalgia of the modern 
sublime is by presenting auditory and visual perceptions that are discontinuous with each 
other. As previously mentioned, for Kant, in perception the imagination normally 
functions as a synthesizer between that which appears before the senses and that which is 
developed as a concept a priori. As Deleuze explains, “Synthesis has two aspects: 
apprehension, by means of which we pose the manifold as occupying a certain space and 
a certain time, by means of which we ‘produce’ different parts in space and time; 
reproduction, by means of which we reproduce the preceding parts as we arrive at the 
ones following….This synthesis, as both apprehension and reproduction, is always 
defined by Kant as an act of the imagination.”45 In the imagination remembered concepts 
and previous sensory intuitions are combined with current sense data to produce 
perception. Once again, in the judgment of the sublime this mechanism of reproduction 
and synthesis fails to function. What happens instead is that “the imagination, although it 
certainly finds nothing beyond the sensible to which it can attach itself, nevertheless feels 
itself to be unbounded precisely because of this elimination of the limits of sensibility; 
and that separation is thus a presentation of the infinite, which for that very reason can 
never be anything other than a merely negative presentation.”46 Thus, in the sublime, 
confronted with its own limitations by reason, the imagination cannot present the Idea to 
the faculty of understanding. This is why Deleuze argues that the sublime forces the 
subject to project: because it is unable to internally present the object to itself, it can do 
nothing but extend outwards.47 
In Opera the imagination tries to mediate between auditory and visual 
perceptions, however, since these are presented discontinuously, the viewer cannot 
synthesize them, presenting viewers with the unpresentable. For example, at one point 
during Opera, the loudspeaker describes itself: “He waits in his room playing his records 
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47 Deleuze, “The Idea of Genesis in Kant’s Esthetics,” 63.  
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over and over. ‘Is that all you do?’ She says.”48 In this moment the audience recognizes 
the structure in front of them, while imagining the dialogue between the main speaker 
and the female character. The speaker recounts a story happening in the present of its 
time, but occurring in the absent-present of the viewer’s time. So that what is actually 
happening, as in what appears to transpire in the physical environment of Opera, and 
what is perceived to be happening, become unified into a singular experience. As Féral 
explains: “On the one hand, the mind absorbs the real, thereby becoming sensitive to it; 
on the other hand, the subject locates within himself the remembered objects or beings, 
recognizes them, and associates them with other features, other ‘mental images.’”49 In 
Opera, memory operates as a means to fill the gaps between sensory impression and the 
idea of imagined experience, using the viewer’s recollection of actual events which blur 
with the events of the work they are experiencing as well as the affective, virtual reality it 
creates—past, affective present or the there that is not there, literal present, and future 
cannot be synthesized. 
 Another example will perhaps be helpful in further illustrating the disconnect 
between auditory and visual sensations. At a certain point this absent-present subject 
narrates through the anthropomorphic speaker: “I was walking down the road that night, 
the cows were in the field watching me as I passed by. I could see the train coming 
slowly towards me, lighting up the trees.”50 After this line viewers hear a train coming 
from speakers behind them; the sound grows louder as the train seems to come closer. 
Here the experience of the subject of the story and the experience of the viewer in the 
room come into conflict. As he relays this tale, the narrator’s past converges with the 
viewer’s present—as well as the viewer’s own past and the narrator’s present—all 
opening onto a future that operates as a collapse of both past and present time.   The 
auditory experience of Opera that creates a specific time-based present encompasses the 
viewer but only by relying on their memory to conjure an experience similar to what they 
are hearing.. As Henri Bergson notes in Matter and Memory, “Perception is never a mere 
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49 Féral, “How to Define Presence Effects…”, 33. 
50 Janet Cardiff and Georges Bures Miller, Opera For a Small Room, 2005.  
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contact of the mind with the object present; it is impregnated with memory-images which 
complete it as they interpret it.”51 Thus, hearing the noise of the train combines with 
images of the viewer’s past experiences with trains. Here, the visual and auditory senses 
receive different information and memory serves the function of filling this gap. 
However, rather than allowing this nostalgic return to come full circle by letting the 
viewer indulge in the absorptive nature of their memory, Opera makes it apparent that 
what the viewer hears is not present physically but is present temporally, through 
memory, drawing them out of their reverie. As the train gets to its loudest point, the room 
in the wooden structure appears to shake—the chandelier on the ceiling trembling back 
and forth—signaling that the train is passing through (fig.17). This physical action brings 
the viewer back into recognition, as a body standing in a room, enabling a sublime 
moment to occur as the viewer acknowledges the illusion.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
51 Henri Bergson, Matter and Memory [1908], trans. N.M. Paul and W.S. Palmer (New York: Zone Books, 
1988), 133.  
Figure 17: "Opera For a Small Room." Detail. Chandelier. 
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A similar event, which creates a comparable sense of disorientation, occurs in The 
Killing Machine using a disco ball. In Killing viewers walk into a space where they are 
confronted with a wooden structure that contains a machine comprised of what resembles 
an empty dental chair with robotic arms poised over it. Above the chair hangs a disco ball 
(fig.18) and on a wooden shelf at the side of the structure lies a guitar (fig.19). Around 
the back and side of the wooden structure are old television monitors (fig.20). At the back 
on the floor there is a drum and hanging to the left of the drum is a metal sheet with a 
mallet that strikes it. Positioned directly in front of the mechanism is a desk with a chair 
and to the left of the desk is a small table on which sits a lamp with a button underneath 
that when pressed, engages the mechanism. Once started, the robotic arms, with lights on 
their ends, perform a kind of dance to a violin symphony that plays in the background 
and which culminates in the torture and killing of the absent-present victim strapped in 
the chair. As articulated in chapter one, in Killing viewers play the role of accidental 
infiltrator on what appears to be some kind corrupt or immoral apparatus. Here viewers 
are confronted by a subject who is not physically present in space but whose presence is 
felt, through the torture that it undergoes. The viewer’s mind obviously conceptualizes 
the absence of the subject through what is intuited by visual sense data however, feelings 
of concern and anguish at the harm of another being, even an absent-present one, are 
temporally evoked. This forged sense of distress, which is felt in a very real way, is 
linked to the use of memory that Killing calls upon. Memories of torture or the killing of 
another being, human or animal, may be foreign to most but experiences of physical pain 
are certainly not. It is the memories of these experiences, things like a broken arm and 
stitches or blood work, that are being conceptually evoked. These recalled experiences in 
the mind of the viewer are what cause Killing to provide an intensely powerful resonance 
for the viewer—I can only infer that this is the reason many observers walk out mid-
action. However, in order for the sublime to take full effect, once again Cardiff and 
Miller prevent the viewer from being caught up in an experience of empathetic pain or 
terror.  
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Figure 18: "The Killing Machine." Detail. Disco ball close-up. 
Figure 19: "The Killing Machine." Detail. Guitar close-up. 
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Once the torture scene has ended, the robotic arms complete their dance by 
swinging around as they admire their handiwork. In doing so, one of the arms knocks the 
disco ball suspended from the top of the wooden structure, sending mirrored reflections 
wobbling across the entirety of the room as the drum and metal sheet are repeatedly 
struck (fig.21). These wobbling beams of light disorient the viewer, bringing them back 
from the action of the machine (the now) and into an identification that allows them to 
acknowledge their body in relation to space (fig.22). Féral describes the relationship of 
presence to the body: “This involvement of the body is twofold: it is connected to thought 
which is activated by sensory organs, but also with the field of awareness and with the 
reactions, sensations and perceptions connected to the physical body. In effect, by 
recognizing a presence (of a being or an object), the intellect is focused, and thus 
becomes sensitive to reality, a reality that inhabits it even as it inhabits reality.”52 In 
recognizing the existence of their body, the viewer is brought back into their own reality. 
                                                
52 Josette Féral, “How to Define Presence Effects…”, 34.  
Figure 20: "The Killing Machine." Detail. Television screens on floor at rear of the 
structure. 
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The disco ball’s wayward motion prevents the viewer from being engrossed in the action 
and allows for a recuperation of the sublime without providing a reconciliation of a lost 
origin.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 21: "The Killing Machine." Detail. Rear view showing drum on the bottom right and metal 
sheet at the top left. 
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This function operates in the reverse during the actual torture scene where, instead 
of being brought back to their body, the viewer is brought back into recognition through 
the punctuation of sound. In Killing, after the mechanism is engaged, the robotic arms 
begin to dance around and flex over the dental chair; midway through this sequence a 
male voice projected through the megaphone, which is attached to an arm hanging down 
from the right side of the apparatus, begins a countdown (fig.23). When the countdown 
reaches the number three the chair is thrust back, a red light comes on, and the robotic 
arms begin to puncture the subject in the chair with needles that shoot out of their heads 
(fig.24). While this particular horrific gesture is something foreign to most as noted 
earlier the experience of pain generally is something we are all familiar with, even if it is 
something routine. The presentation of torture in Killing in this particular fashion recalls 
previous memories and, in their re-communication and re-saturation with new meanings, 
Figure 22: "The Killing Machine." Detail. Disco ball effect. 
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they produce the possibility of alternative cognition through “using all the aesthetic cues 
that have come down to us as cultural signifiers of intensity which we learn from infancy 
on. In turn, the audiences react to their own processes of emotional learning, playing 
these corporal ‘memories’ back in their body and very often amplifying them.”53 During 
this sequence cultural signifiers of pain are recalled and re-invested with a new kind of 
intensity. However, rather than letting the viewer be completely occupied with their own 
recollected engagement with pain, the punctuated noise of the stabbing needles and the 
distinct sound of the metal sheet being hit shocks them into self-awareness, bringing them 
outside of their body. Kim-Cohen describes this process of immersion and recognition 
followed by recuperation in sound: “Sound-in-itself similarly tries to objectify the 
auditory, ignoring its inexorable entanglement with time. But there is no such thing as a 
sonic freeze-frame. With audio recordings, if the playback is paused, the sound occurring 
at the moment of interruption does not hang, object-like, in the air but evaporates, 
recuperable only in memory... It shuttles in time, constituted by a cascade of befores and 
afters, but lacking any positively identifiable now. ”54 Applying this to Killing, just as the 
punctuated sound of the needle signals the stabbing of the absent-present subject in the 
chair, a sound event occurs that simultaneously brings the viewer into the fragmentary 
space of the sublime and then allows them to re-enter the narrative they’ve produced 
through memory, only to bring them out again through the next sharp noise. This constant 
rupturing of memory followed by recuperation and rupture again, prohibits Killing’s 
fulfillment of the nostalgic return triggered through memory, eliminating any hope of 
synthesis the viewer might wish for.  
 
 
 
                                                
53 Nigel Thrift, Non-Representational Theory: Space, Politics, Affect (New York: Routledge, Taylor and 
Francis Group, 2008), 196.  
54 Kim-Cohen, In the Blink of an Ear, 223-224.  
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Figure 23: "The Killing Machine." Detail. Megaphone close-up. 
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Figure 24: "The Killing Machine." Detail. Robotic arm head with light and needle. 
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One could argue that both Killing and Opera rely on remembered cultural 
signifiers in order to produce their effect; although this is true, these works function as 
monuments to events that never happened, producing a space without memory, thus 
undermining any tendency towards an authentic lost origin. In “Percept, Affect, and 
Concept,” Deleuze and Félix Guattari argue that every work of art possesses a proclivity 
for commemoration of the past, but this commemoration cannot be so: “It is true that 
every work is a monument, but here the monument is not something commemorating a 
past, it is a bloc of present sensations that owe their preservation only to themselves and 
that provide the event with the compound that celebrates it. The monument’s action is not 
memory but fabulation.”55 In this passage Deleuze and Guattari point out that the work of 
art, rather than evoke or preserve the past, preserves something of its own accord through 
its own eventfulness. Cardiff and Miller’s artworks make this apparent through the ways 
in which they preserve events of a fictitious nature. Opera and Killing oppose historical 
experience by forcing the viewer to witness the event as performance, a fiction in 
process, despite the fact that they perform the inauthentic events they reference in a way 
that feels authentic.   
The task of re-presenting an authentic event is necessarily undermined by the very 
nature of authenticity as a mode of experience. This is due to the fact that the historical 
event, embedded in memory, is always something that exceeds the ability to be 
represented: the act of remembering is caught in the interim between the event, which 
occurred in the past, and the process of representation, which occurs in the present. 
Speaking to the difficulties of recollection in his essay “Emotional Performances as 
Dramas of Authenticity,” E. Doyle McCarthy defines authenticity as a “means to feel 
something with honesty, integrity, and vitality and to express in one’s life the truth of 
one’s personal insights and discoveries.”56 For McCarthy, authenticity is always double 
headed in that it involves both feeling and expression of the past/passed. However, this 
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idea of the authentic, the representation of historical events, will always already be 
incomplete: memory unavoidably eludes all representations. In this sense, the act of 
representing memory exists between a mimesis, or a showing, and a diegesis, or a 
recounting via narrative of the individual experience. The very nature of this action 
presents a dichotomy between the experience of the individual and the record of that 
experience which will never coalesce. The past and the passed are always split: there is 
no present to speak of. Dominic LaCapra, in his text History and its Limits: Human, 
Animal, Violence, illustrates this split as: “the collapse, via the sublime and its excess, of 
any distinction between event and experience, both of which exceed knowledge and 
representation to the point of becoming ineffable, yet paradoxically demanding 
impossible testimony (the double bind).”57 Cardiff/Miller present viewers with this 
paradox in Opera and Killing by producing works that have some loose basis in reality, 
but have no memory to speak of.  
The records contained in Opera belonged to a man who lived in rural Canada and 
were purchased at a rummage sale.58 According to Lange, the concept for the piece was 
to recreate “a diagram of their owner’s chaotic mind,” the space itself resembling a 
loner’s personal retreat. 59 The records themselves are attached to an actual person for 
whom Cardiff and Miller fabricate a character. A similar effect is produced with Killing, 
which is tied to Franz Kafka’s In the Penal Colony (first published in 1919), and is also 
reminiscent of the American justice system, which employs capital punishment.60 Once 
again, this object is loosely based on some elements from reality (the novel and the U.S. 
justice system); however, it is largely a construct of the artists’ imagination. So, while 
both Opera and Killing contain some actual, common, culturally constructed markers that 
constitute social life, and which rely directly on memory for evocation, because they do 
have an actual history behind them they are  “immune to the lure of nostalgia for the lost 
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origin or the promise of an imminent telos.”61 Although these works hinge on memory, 
Opera and Killing provide “a transformation from the it-centrality of the Kantian, 
modern, sublime, to the discursive and dispersive Lyotardian, postmodern sublime”, 
opening the way to an understanding that the past is always re-actualized in the present.62 
While it is true, as Brian Massumi points out, that perception is always a transfer between 
that which happened and that which is, memory does not exist as something that 
represents a lost past that is separate from the present.63 Rather, as Deleuze explains 
through Bergson: “Recollection is not the representation of something that was; the past 
is that in which we put ourselves from the outset in order to recollect ourselves…[The 
past] has not ceased to be, it has only ceased to be useful – it is; it survives in itself…The 
past is not constituted after it has been present; it coexists with itself as present.”64 
Deleuze’s argument here demonstrates that the past is contemporary with the present; in 
the process of recall the past is not only refashioned in the present, it comes into being in 
the present. In creating artworks whose very history comes into existence through their 
presentation, Cardiff and Miller highlight this notion and avoid the tendency towards the 
lost authentic origin of the modern Kantian sublime. As Lyotard notes: “One wants to get 
hold of the past, grasp what has gone away, master, exhibit the initial crime, the lost 
crime of the origin, show it as such as though it could be disentangled from its affective 
context, the connotations of fault, of shame, of pride, of anguish in which we are still 
plunged at present, and which are precisely what motivate the idea of an origin.”65 What 
becomes sublime then about the Cardiff/Miller artworks is the ways in which they put 
forward this origin in presentation as the unpresentable itself. By showing us that 
memory is not a representation of the unpresentable because this origin itself is a fallacy, 
Cardiff and Miller reclaim memory as a vital function of the postmodern sublime by 
using it as a presentation of the unpresentable, creating a space without memory.  
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Chapter 3  
   Time: the Sublime and the Event  
In the Critique of Pure Reason Kant puts forth an argument that seeks to ground 
all experience in two faculties: inner and outer sense. Inner sense, corresponding to time, 
and outer sense, corresponding to space, together make up the transcendental faculties of 
pure reason. Kant’s project in the first critique serves as an investigation into how the 
external world appears. Consequently, Kant argues that the grounding of time in space is 
what makes all appearance possible. As we have already covered in some detail Opera 
for a Small Room and The Killing Machine are two artworks that challenge the traditional 
conception of time and space through the ways in which they pose questions for 
presentation in terms of present/presence. In this chapter I examine how Opera and 
Killing challenge the traditional relationship between subject and object through the ways 
in which they allow us to see subjectivity as a temporal construction. As works where 
there is a physical distance between the work and the viewer, Opera and Killing 
demonstrate that the subject/object dichotomy can be dissolved through an engagement 
with perception in the realm of the temporal. By altering traditional conceptions of time 
and space, and by troubling notions of representation and appearance, Cardiff and Miller 
revive questions of time. Achieved largely through the use of sound, the aesthetics of 
Opera and Killing present an event-bound time—a time that is not grounded in space. 
The sound events of Opera and Killing are present temporally but not spatially, which 
produces an effect that can be characterized as avisual. I argue that, by confronting the 
viewer with works that are events, Opera and Killing allow us to acknowledge that time 
cannot be objectified. Instead, Opera and Killing place one in the present/presence—the 
now—a space without memory. This despatialization of time through the unpresentability 
of sound grants the viewer a sublime experience through the ways in which they are led 
to understand differently.   
In order to understand the manipulation of space and time in Cardiff and Miller’s 
work, which decenters the subject thereby giving rise to the sublime, it is first necessary 
to examine the ways in which space and time are traditionally understood. First it is 
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important to note that Kant’s conception of time and space is integral to his overall 
project in the CPR. As briefly mentioned in chapter one, in the CPR Kant considers the 
question of how the world appears to humans in the particular way that it does. In order 
to avoid falling into either solipsism or skepticism in his enquiry, Kant draws together 
empiricism and rationalism: that which is intuited through sense—a posteriori, and that 
which is brought to bear on experience through concepts—a priori. Thus, Kant separates 
sensible experience from reasonable understanding: where knowledge requires empirical 
data, a posteriori, understanding entails the combination of sensible data with reason. By 
allowing knowledge domain over the sensible, Kant is able to preserve epistemology 
while avoiding having to reduce empirical knowledge to either relativism or solipsism. 
While one can gain sensible knowledge through observation, one can only gain 
understanding through the combination of these physical sensible perceptions with the 
nonsensible ordered relations, a priori.  
Recall that for Kant the categories exist as two forms of sense: inner and outer. 
Time corresponds to the former and space to the latter. In Kantian terms, the only way 
subjects can come to understanding is through the situation of the external world in the 
outer sense of space and inner sense of time. Kant states: 
Space is a necessary representation, a priori, which is the ground of all outer 
intuitions. One can never represent that there is no space, although one can very 
well think that there are no objects to be encountered in it. It is therefore to be 
regarded as the condition of the possibility of appearances, not as a determination 
dependent on them, and is an a priori representation that necessarily grounds 
outer appearances.66  
Here Kant maintains that space cannot be separated from objects; there can never be no 
space. Thus, space is the very possibility of the appearance of the external world to the 
subject; however, space is not contained in the external world itself. In this way, as 
Roberto Torretti suggests in his essay “On the Subjectivity of Objective Space,” the 
Kantian concept of space is both subjectively understood as the real physical space of the 
external world, but also as a transcendentally ideal space. This allows Kant to “[maintain] 
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the subjectivity of objective space.”67 Space grounds the appearance of the external world 
as an objective principle while also allowing the subject to perceive objects in space.  
Similarly, time as inner sense functions as the second co-ordinate, which allows 
for the possibility of all experience. Kant writes:  
1) Time is not an empirical concept that is somehow drawn from an experience. 
For simultaneity or succession would not themselves come into perception if the 
representation of time did not ground them a priori. Only under its presupposition 
can one represent that several things exist at one and the same time 
(simultaneously) or in different times (successively). 2) Time is a necessary 
representation that grounds all intuitions. In regard to appearances in general one 
cannot remove time, though one can very well take the appearances away from 
time. Time is therefore given a priori. In it alone is all actuality of appearances 
possible. The latter could all disappear, but time itself, as the universal condition 
of their possibility, cannot be removed.68 
Time, like space, is here seen as both subjective in its existence in inner sense, but 
objective in its operation as the “universal condition” of the possibility of our 
understanding of the external world as situated within time. As with space, time is both 
phenomenally real, in that its passage is acknowledged within the external world, and 
transcendentally ideal, in that its operation is purely a product of subjective (inner) 
measurement. Both the concepts of time and space have the ability to function as bridges 
between the empirical (observable, a posteriori) and rational (subjective, a priori) 
understandings that, in Kantian terms, constitute the entirety of experience.  
Adhering to these traditional conceptions of space and time as co-ordinates that 
allow us to bridge together subjective (self) experience and the objective (outside) world 
has led to a highly problematic dichotomy between subject and object. In order to 
challenge this construction, many contemporary artists have begun to create works that 
involve physically immersive spaces that dissolve the division between the active 
perceiving subject and the passive object. However, Cardiff and Miller’s works Opera 
and Killing provide situations where, even though this division is physically maintained, 
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it is temporally dissolved. Janet Cardiff’s solo work and her early collaboration with 
Miller, The Paradise Institute from 2001, are examples of works that attempt to challenge 
the subject/object dichotomy through immersive environments, creating an intimacy in 
which the viewer’s subjective space bleeds into the objective space of the work, and vice 
versa. Conversely, in Opera and Killing the viewer is set back from the work and is able 
to observe it from a physical distance only. Rather than producing a physically immersive 
space that tries to reproduce an accurate experience of environment, for example being in 
a theatre as with The Paradise Insitute, Opera and Killing set viewers apart from the 
work while still dissolving the traditional relationship between subject and object.  
In order to demonstrate how this dissolve operates in spite of the fact that Opera 
and Killing still appear to adhere to traditional artistic conventions, it will be worthwhile 
to explore Cardiff and Miller’s earlier creations. In Janet Cardiff’s solo works, 
specifically her “audio walks,” viewers put on a headset and are narrated on a set path, 
like a walking tour. Here, Cardiff uses binaural sound to overlap and create, in real-time, 
the effect of walking through the space that the viewer hears on the headset, while 
actually walking through the space. The real sounds overlap with the virtual sounds and 
with Cardiff’s own voice as she presents disjointed narratives and speaks to the viewer. 
In terms of their collaborative efforts, The Paradise Institute, which was presented at the 
2001 Venice Biennale, attempts to reproduce an environmentally accurate experience of 
theatre. In this work viewers step inside a recreated theatre and take a seat in a movie 
theatre chair, which overlooks a miniature screen and more seats, on what is fabricated to 
look like the second floor balcony. Putting a set of headphones on, the viewer will hear 
and watch a disjointed film with the sounds of a theatre unfolding around them and 
Cardiff’s voice beside them whispering as if in their ear—all once again with the use of 
binaural sound. In both of these examples (Cardiff’s audio walks and The Paradise 
Institute) the use of binaural sound is what creates the reality of the environmental space. 
Hanssen describes the effect of binaural technology as an auditory deception or trompe 
l’orielle effect.69  She argues that, more so than its visual counter part the trompe l’oeil, 
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trompe l’orielle is more convincingly ‘real’ because there is no objective/spatial 
distance.70 Conversely, Cardiff and Miller’s later works The Killing Machine and Opera 
for a Small Room manipulate this previously rejected objective distance to create an 
illusionary experience that, rather than relying on spatiality, plays with perception in the 
realm of the temporal. Because Opera and Killing do not recreate immersive 
environments, but produce dispositions as part of the presentation of events, they 
manipulate and challenge the dichotomy between subject and object, even more so than 
Cardiff/Miller’s earlier works, by acknowledging the extent to which this category is a 
temporal or cognitive structure rather than a spatial one.   
To further illustrate the effect created by distancing the viewer in Opera and 
Killing, it is necessary to examine the tension created between intimacy, or a kind of 
privileged access afforded to the viewer, and this physical distance. In Killing viewers are 
drawn into a scene through the intimate or private nature of its subject matter, but are also 
set apart from the work through its performative qualities. As with the sublime or 
present/presence, the viewer is simultaneously drawn in, and set apart from, or rejected 
by, the work. What we witness with Killing has the appearance of a very private and 
confidential act: viewers get the impression that they have stumbled onto a basement 
torture scene or secret government operation and the work seduces the viewer by making 
them privy to information or actions that they are not meant to see. While this may be 
true, the ways in which the act of torture is performed would suggest otherwise. As the 
robotic arms dance around and prepare for the killing ritual that will take place, the 
viewer becomes acutely aware of this act as a production. As one of the arms strains itself 
across the chair, elegantly stretching in preparation for the performance, the viewer is 
drawn wholly into their body and becomes mere spectator.  
This effect repeats in Opera where viewers come upon a walled structure with 
openings or windows through which they can peer. When the piece begins, viewers hear 
Miller’s voice emanating from the central speaker: “In the middle of the stage a man sits 
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alone in a room surrounded by speakers, turntables and records. (fig.26)”71 Even in this 
first piece of narration the tension between intimacy and distance—similar to rejection 
and recuperation in the sublime—is already produced. In one breath the male voice tells 
us that a man sits on a stage—setting up the performance that will follow and 
highlighting the objective distance between performer and observer. However, in this line 
the male voice also tells us that a man sits alone in a room, granting a kind of intimacy to 
the scene that is reinforced by the story that follows as the man reminisces about his past. 
The effect of intimacy is also amplified by the use of the male voice, played by Miller, 
whose voice, like Cardiff’s in the Paradise Institute, “triggers self-consciousness rather 
than identification” producing an authenticity that, instead of fabricating an illusion, 
makes the viewer more aware of themselves.72  So although the viewer, through the use 
of Miller’s voice, is drawn into a scene that is quite intimate in nature, they are also 
distanced from the work though the maintenance of the objective boundary between 
spectator and performance/performer. This push/pull relationship that exists in Opera and 
Killing between intimacy and physical distance preserves but also shatters the expected 
relationship between subject and object, once again, granting viewers the realization that 
this dichotomy is a temporal creation, not a spatial one.  
The realization of the primacy of the temporal in breaking down the divide 
between subject and object is where Opera and Killing can be considered, in relation to 
the sublime, as the ungrounding of time in space. Typically, in order for time to be 
apprehended it is seen as grounded in space. The problem, in Kant’s words, is that “space 
alone persistently determines, while time, however, and thus everything that is in inner 
sense, constantly flows.”73 As a result “time, although it is not itself an object of outer 
intuition at all, cannot be made representable to us except under the image of a line…we 
must always derive the determination of the length of time or also of the positions of time 
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for all inner perceptions from that which presents external things to us as alterable…”74 
Reading these two passages together we recognize that there is a subtle distinction to be 
made between measurable time and observable time. While Kant acknowledges time as 
an observable force, he understands that the human conception of time is a mere 
representation, a measurement, of something whose presence is felt through its sensible 
affects and effects only. Because time itself is an absent-presence it can only be 
understood through its representation or measurement in space. Due to the fact that the 
passage of time is an absent- presence, “Knowledge of an enduring self” and, for that 
matter, the external world “requires something permanent, and this, in turn, requires the 
permanent in outer sense.”75 As such, the grounding of the external world and the self in 
time is the predicate for all knowledge including that of the subjective self. Thus, to de-
spatialize time or to understand time as present/presence—an experience which the 
Cardiff/Miller works engender—completely dismantles the notion of subjectivity through 
the inability of the self-conscious to represent the self to itself. What does this mean then 
in terms of the sublime? How does time function in the sublime?   
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Figure 25: "Opera For a Small Room." Detail. Turntable. 
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The sublime as pure presence/present can be further elucidated in terms of the 
Kantian conception of space and time and their relationship to the imagination. As 
discussed at length in chapter two, at the sublime moment reason confronts the 
imagination with its limit: the imagination fails to present the Idea of reason to the 
understanding. As Lyotard notes in Lessons on the Analytic of the Sublime, in terms of 
space and time the imagination “must give up synthesizing [them] (which are thus no 
longer space and time as forms of intuition)” instead the imagination “[signals] the 
unpresentable “presence” of an object of thought that is not an object of experience, but 
which cannot be sentimentally deciphered anywhere except upon the object of 
experience.”76 In the experience of the sublime the imagination ceases to synthesize time 
and space so that they no longer function as co-ordinates. Rather, in the sublime time 
becomes despatialized producing a pure present/presence or space without memory: it is 
an event, a temporal happening with no spatial or material referent. How does the idea of 
despatialized time in the sublime, as a space without memory, relate to the notion of time 
and the event in Lyotard, and how does this relate to the work of Cardiff and Miller?  
The nature of Opera and Killing as durational and performative artworks means 
they function as experiences lending themselves to the discourse of the event. In The 
Image in French Philosophy Temenuga Trifonova describes Lyotards’s notion of the 
event as a “phenomenon without a past.”77 Meaning that the event, rather than being a 
spatial category, is actually a temporal one, or a space without memory. The event is a 
mode of being that cannot be objectified or represented.78 Rather than being a question of 
cause and effect, the event is irreducible to origins and merely is or occurs.79 More 
broadly, the notion of the event in Lyotard’s work describes his critique of the 
phenomenology of time.80 As noted in chapter one, Lyotard describes a shift in the visual 
arts historically: from attempting to present the sublime through the transgression of 
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space, to the contemporary moment, which presents the sublime through an engagement 
with the event—producing an event-bound time.81 With works like Opera and Killing 
viewers are not drawn into the sublime experience through total immersion, transgressing 
space from the inside out, rather they are events and thus participate in event-bound time.  
The use of sound throughout Opera and Killing is vital to the presentation, in 
these works, of the event through event-bound time. The symphony is responsible for 
producing the story in Killing. From the moment the spectator presses the button, 
engaging the mechanism, the violins narrate the action of the sequence. Without the 
distinct melody of the violins, the work would not be able to create such affective 
resonances. Sound in Killing also initiates the actual torture, which follows a countdown 
from the megaphone speaker that hangs from the ceiling of the structure. It also adds 
weight and intensity to the act of killing in the work— the stabbing of the robotic arms is 
punctuated by sharp hydraulic snaps. As was mentioned earlier, in Opera Miller’s voice 
becomes a character. Heard through the megaphone speaker, which takes on an 
anthropomorphic quality as a result, Miller’s voice is what gives the male subject the 
feeling of presence even though, in actuality, there is no subject in the work. As Janet 
Cardiff explains, 
The way we use audio makes you much more aware of your own body, 
and makes you much more aware of your place within the world, of your 
body as a “real” construction…If you give someone hyper-reality, then 
they have more of a perspective on what’s really real. You are hearing the 
sound behind you, and you know it’s not real, but you want to turn around 
to look for it. It relates to our primordial defense mechanisms.82 
The ways in which Cardiff and Miller use sound in Opera and Killing creates an illusion 
that brings the viewer back to the reality of their own body once the deception becomes 
apparent. This absorption in illusion, and subsequent recognition of this illusion, is most 
certainly tied to the idea of event-bound time and the sublime in Lyotard.  
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 As Cardiff has described, sound in Opera and Killing plays with conceptions of 
reality by staging elements which are absent spatially, but present temporally, endowing 
the work with a kind of absent-presence. Thinking through this perpetually absent 
presence/present necessitates thinking through the failure of presentation. As Lyotard 
makes clear in this passage, the very unthinkability or incomprehensibility of the sublime 
is rooted in the failure of the imagination, as considered at length in chapter two: “In the 
sublime ‘situation’, something like an Absolute, either of magnitude or of power, is made 
quasi-perceptible (the word is Kant’s) due to the very failing of the faculty of 
presentation.”83 Once again, this failure refers back to the inability of the imagination to 
present the Idea to the faculty of reason, which is why the sublime is unpresentable. Thus, 
to endow something with absent-presence is the only way one can present the 
unpresentable: by making apparent that there is something not present in presentation 
itself. With regard to the event, the sublime presents one with the image that Trifonova 
defines “negatively as an event, as the mere possibility of something happening despite 
the threat of nothing else happening.”84 Here, Trifonova’s argument is similar to 
Lyotard’s suggestion (as touched on in chapter one) that the sublime takes place between 
an instant, or an occurrence, and a moment in which a cognitive understanding is 
developed about that occurrence. Thus, the sublime can be characterized by a tension 
between immersion and recognition or self-awareness. This brief fragment is event-
bound time.  
The use of sound, in Opera and Killing, to present that which is not present 
functions to present the unpresentable, or a space without memory. As Lyotard 
understands it with the perception of sound:   
The ear is given over to something incomparable (and therefore something 
unrepeatable) in what is called the performance, i.e. to the here and now of the 
sound, in their singularity, in their one-offness, in the aspect by which they are, by 
virtue of their position, not subjected to any spatio-temporal transfer. This transfer 
can consist in no more than the maintenance of the ‘same’ sound in memory for 
even a short duration – this does not alter the fact that it immediately changes the 
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here into the there, the now into the then. And so present nuance changes into a 
nuance reported, retained, deferred, so that it becomes a different nuance.85 
Due to the fact that sound rejects synthesis, Opera and Killing’s use of sound to produce 
events that are not there points to the unrepeatability of the event itself. This is echoed by 
the fact that although one may try to replicate the sound event, “this matter, so tenuous 
that it is as though immaterial, is not repeatable, this is because by being subjected to its 
seizure by that matter, the mind is stripped of its faculty – both aesthetic and intelligent – 
to bind it, associate it, I’d like to say narrativize it, and therefore, in one way or another 
(metaphysical or ontological) to repeat it.”86 Thus, even though many of the sounds used 
in Opera and Killing have the appearance of familiarity—the intimacy of Miller’s voice, 
the violin symphony, and the punctures of the robotic arms all enter the space of the 
foreign and indescribable, and thus the sublime; they cannot be repeated, meaning they 
cannot be represented. These sound events cannot be reduced or objectified spatially, 
instead, they present themselves through time. Kim-Cohen refers to the unpresentability 
of sound as “non-cochlear sound.”87 This condition of sound is akin to the aesthetics of 
avisuality,88 which produces a kind of distancing or non-recognition—that which cannot 
be visualized, cannot be presented—aptly describing that which is perpetually present, 
yet always absent. Sound cannot be objectified and therefore cannot be grounded in 
space; sound itself is space without memory.   
Another key way that Cardiff and Miller’s work disrupts the viewer’s sense of 
time as grounded in space is by presenting forms of nonlinear time that deny historical 
progression, telos, and origins. Linear time, represented in narrative, orders events, 
placing them in a particular trajectory usually seen as a result of certain causes and 
effects. In the words of Lyotard: “More precisely, narratives are like temporal filters 
whose function is to transform the emotive charge linked to the event into sequences of 
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units of information capable of giving rise to something like meaning.”89 In this way, 
narratives take event(s) and string them together to grant them meaning.  This is not to 
say that bereft of narrative we would be unable to produce meaning, but rather that 
meaning itself would be understood non-chronologically. In Opera viewers are presented 
with a discontinuous non-teleological story, demonstrating a case where past, present, 
and future converge.  
For example, at one point near the beginning of the piece the male voice tells us 
in a singsong drawl: “She was walking down the road. She was walking down the road 
with her shoes in her hand. Where the f**k is she going?”90 Even in this moment past, 
present, and future are not where they typically would be. Viewers are taken away from 
the initial narrative of the man in the room with his records and into another story about a 
female character walking down a road without shoes. While this could be a memory from 
the male character’s past, it could also be happening in the present for two reasons: 1) he 
finishes the thought by asking in present tense where she is going; and 2) relying on their 
memory to create this image, the viewer is compelled by the narration to imagine a 
woman walking down a road. However, we do not remain with this story for long as, 
once again, the viewer is pulled back into the room with the absent-present male 
character as he hums along to the background music. Before the viewer gets too 
comfortable here, a rainstorm can be heard coming from the speakers on the surrounding 
walls of the exhibition space. Is this rain happening in viewer’s present, or the male 
character’s, or perhaps even to the in female character’s as she walks down the road? One 
cannot be sure and, just as the viewer is immersed in their memory of rain, the storm 
culminates in thunder and dies off. The male voice, bringing the viewer back into another 
story, says: “This place is falling apart. The animals are taking over. The weasels ate the 
mice and the squirrels. The mice are chewing on the wires in the walls; if they start on the 
records I’ll have to poison them.”91 Again, as viewers we are unable to locate ourselves 
in time: are the animals in the gallery? In the room with the man or, do they exist in the 
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fictional story the male voice narrates? The answer is: all of the above. The story that 
Opera tells is one that hinges on memory, or the past, and this past belongs to the viewer, 
but is also external to them, pointing to the events of Opera as an image: “a phenomenon 
without a past” or a space without a memory.92 
Narrative is a cognitive device that allows us to order and make sense of the 
present, which we are incapable of grasping:  
Because it is an absolute, the presenting present cannot be grasped: it is not yet or 
no longer present. It is always too soon or too late to grasp presentation itself and 
present it. Such is the specific and paradoxical constitution of the event. That 
something happens, the occurrence, means that the mind is disappropriated…The 
event makes the self incapable of taking possession and control of what it is. It 
testifies that the self is essentially passible to a recurrent alterity.93  
Cardiff and Miller’s work, through the presentation of events that testify to the absence of 
the present, demonstrate the failure of linear time. This failure of linear time in Opera 
points to the failure of the subjective lie: the viewer is unable to locate themselves in 
time, indicating that much of what we perceive and think is predicated upon a fictitious 
structure in the mind of the viewer, and that this gesture is sublime.94  
In Opera and Killing the sublime failure of linear time is further amplified by the 
looping of the works which, according to Megha Rajguru’s analysis of Cardiff’s Forty-
part Motet, can be seen as “[eliciting] an overall experience of nonlinearity and a 
phenomenon rather than a narrative with a beginning, middle and an end.”95 The 
Cardiff/Miller works engage in this process by presenting stories that are not linear but 
cyclical. Opera is a looped work; so although the symphony ends and applause resounds 
from the speakers, this end is not really an end in the typical sense because the work 
almost immediately begins again. A similar technique occurs in Killing where, although 
the piece seems to come to a logical conclusion, this is not entirely the case. Killing 
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presumably ends when the torture of the subject culminates in its death, coming to a 
precise end as the robotic arms dance around. During this sequence the machine turns off 
rather abruptly (almost mid-action), cutting off the symphony track and the lights, the 
action coming to a dead stop. However, cyclical time is subtly implied as the light on the 
table over the start button slowly turns back on and ominously readjusts to the precise 
level of brightness at which it was found (fig.25). This action implies a cyclicality to the 
event at hand, rather than linearity as it would initially seem. The cyclicality of both 
Opera and Killing implies an infinite repeatability that can never be realized. As Lyotard 
states: “Here is the story I would like to tell you: that repetition escapes from repetition in 
order to repeat. That in trying to have itself forgotten, it fixes its forgetting, and thus 
repeats its absence.”96 If we see the sublime as the failure of presentation, or 
repeatability, this will always mean that an event will repeat its own absence. The 
repeatability of Opera and Killing can never be achieved, despite the fact that their 
repetition is implied, because the event itself cannot be repeated. Just as the man who sits 
alone in the room in Opera continuously reliving his memories, destined to witness their 
absence, the event itself cannot be represented. This unrepeatability of the event lends 
itself to the despatialization of time in the event as, once again, we are confronted with 
the acknowledgement that time cannot be contained or objectified—it cannot be 
spatialized.  
                                                
96 Lyotard, The Inhuman, 153.  
61 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
By altering traditional notions of spatiality and temporality, Cardiff and Miller’s 
work decenters the subject—giving rise to a sublime experience. Despite the fact that 
both Opera and Killing seemingly maintain the boundary between subject and object, by 
maintaining this distinction in space they are able to problematize it through temporality. 
In presenting the viewer with sound events, or actions that are given entirely through 
sound, Opera and Killing confront the viewer with the event-bound time of the sublime, 
demonstrating that time cannot be objectified. In its use of nonlinear or nonsequential 
time Opera takes this one step further by challenging the objectification of time to 
produce telos through narrative. The looping of both Opera and Killing, which points out 
the unrepeatability, or unpresentability of the event, further amplifies the despatialization 
Figure 26: "The Killing Machine." Detail. Start button with lamp. 
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of time, presenting viewers with the absent-presence of the sublime, space without 
memory. 
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Chapter 4  
    Subjectivity: the Ontology of the Sublime  
This chapter explores the ontological significance of the sublime in the works of 
Cardiff and Miller. Opera and Killing allow us to ask what it means to have presence as a 
being in the moment of the sublime, and what happens to the subject at the moment of 
sublime encounter. Due to the fact that the sublime happens, or is an event, that which 
operates as present/presence, it resists totalization—making the sublime bereft of 
consciousness. Thus, the subject of sublime experience is a very different kind of being 
than the human; they are the inhuman. Like the postmodern, which marks the death of 
grand narrative, the inhuman for Lyotard is the narrative that marks the death of the 
human. Using the Kantian notion of the sublime as the failure of presentation or the 
acknowledgement of the unpresentable, Lyotard argues for the disruption of narrative 
through the recognition of the sublime as the ever present and yet, always absent: the that 
that experience cannot account for. As such, in Lyotard’s view the sublime requires a 
simultaneous rejection and reliance on understanding in order to exist both within and 
outside the narrative of experience. Thus, the inhuman as the subject of this that is not a 
nonhuman, an unhuman, or the inhumane: it is the human becoming other through the 
event. I argue that Opera and Killing force a confrontation or disruption of the human as 
the subject of experience, allowing us to see the inhuman as the entity which bears 
witness to a space without memory or an event—the sublime.  
Opera and Killing can be used as critiques that show the limitations of viewing 
the sublime through the transcendental categories. Rather than a suspension of time and 
space, this thesis sees the sublime as the unpresent presence of pure time, a time 
past/passed space. Reintroducing the sublime as a spaceless time allows for the 
development of a vocabulary with which to speak about experience without a subject.  
Consequently, the inhuman may be seen as that which allows Lyotard to write the story 
of the subject without positing a subject. In doing so, the inhuman becomes a mask that, 
just as it conceals, reveals itself as a mask hiding nothing. Thus, Lyotard’s inhuman can 
be seen as inviting the question of being in time: where does the human lie? In this 
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reading the sublime is the climate of disruption that highlights this lie and, in doing so, 
forces the posthuman question: when am I? It is with this question that we can begin to 
examine Opera and Killing as works that allow us to conduct an ontological investigation 
of the nature of time and its relationship to subjective thought or story (memory).  
As discussed in chapter two and three, the sublime presents a moment of failure. 
This failure presents us with a moment in which all normative cognitive devices fall 
short: consciousness ceases to function. Cardiff and Miller’s works Opera and Killing 
present viewers with circumstances through which they can experience the sublime loss 
of subjectivity. While Kant’s conception of the sublime points to a failure of the 
imagination to represent an Idea, in his view reason is still something that can fill the 
void left by this lack.97  In the words of Trifonova, “Reason is something we can fall 
back on after we have stripped ourselves of the sensible and feel vulnerable because of 
the failure of the imagination.”98 Thus, in the failure of other faculties, reason prevails, 
defining the human as a rational animal and giving the sublime ontological significance.  
In what follows, I investigate how thinking of the sublime through the concept of 
presence/present—space without memory—preserves this ontological enquiry while 
yielding a very different result. This particular idea of human as rational is very much in 
line with Enlightenment thinking however Lyotard’s project and our investigation here 
attempts to revise this understanding. While Lyotard argues that what is most central to 
the human is reflective thought, the sublime as failure operates as a two-fold failure.99 
The sublime, while a failure of the imagination, is also a failure of reason. The failure of 
reason in the sublime points to a distinctive conception of the human—one that Lyotard 
calls inhuman.  
Opera and Killing present the sublime as the loss of self. This condition is 
inhuman because, just as the sublime rejects subjectivity, it also requires recuperation. 
The sublime operates both within and outside narratives of experience. In this way the 
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sublime’s threat to subjectivity poses a question for ontology. If the sublime presents a 
failure of reason, as well as a failure of the imagination—a failure of subjectivity, then it 
necessarily forces us to question the very meaning of the human. As Trifonova states, 
“The postmodern sublime, on the other hand, has an ontological significance for it 
(supposedly) restores the reality of the world by eliminating the tyranny of totalizing 
subjectivity.”100 By eliminating totalizing subjectivity, the sublime exposes the 
constructed nature of the human. If reason is what is proper to the human, then what 
happens when reason fails, and what does this failure present? Because the failure of the 
sublime occurs when the imagination is confronted with its own limit and reason cannot 
totalize a narrative, the sublime—the limit itself—possesses a dual nature. As Lyotard 
notes: “It is the limit itself that understanding cannot conceive of as its object. The limit 
is only conceivable with an outside and an inside. The limit, that is, immediately implies 
both the limited and the unlimited.”101 Thus, the sublime, or the limit, exists 
simultaneously within and outside of experience: in order to exist outside, as the 
unpresentable, the sublime presupposes the inside to which it must always return. Lyotard 
argues that, just as the sublime oscillates between the inside and outside of thought, so 
too does the inhuman: “We should first remember that if the name of human can and 
must oscillate between native indetermination and instituted or self-instituting reason, it 
is the same for the name of inhuman. All education is inhuman because it does not 
happen without constraint and terror…”102 The inhuman, like the sublime, must oscillate 
between the ungraspable and that which can be situated within reason; it depends both on 
the inside and outside of thought.  
In order to first affect the idea of subjectivity as a temporal category Opera and 
Killing move the viewer through various subjective conditions that highlight the lie of the 
subject as something that exists not in physical space but temporally. The viewer takes on 
the function of eavesdropper, witness, participant, and observer, often moving through 
these various subjective roles or occupying multiple positions at once. Coming upon 
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Opera or Killing viewers initially play the role of the eavesdropper: an individual who 
happens upon events that are not meant for their witnessing. McGinley, in considering 
the relationship between eavesdropping and performance, asserts that “the etymology of 
the term “eavesdropping” delineates a relationship between listening in and domestic 
architectures: the eavesdropper is one who hangs out under the eaves of the house in 
order to listen in. Domestic architecture, then, creates the conditions of possibility for 
eavesdropping.”103 This idea—the domestic setting creating an opportunity for 
eavesdropping—is certainly true of Opera where the structure that viewers are presented 
with resembles a garage or a shed in which viewers are subsequently told that a man sits 
alone inside, listening to his records. Peering through the sides or the back of the 
structure, one feels as though they are watching and listening to events that are private in 
nature: the subject of the work (the absent-present man in the chair) is unaware of the 
presence of an outsider, he is unaware that he is being watched. However, as McGinley 
also points out, there is a historical connection between performance and eavesdropping 
that can also be applied here.104 In Opera the performative elements of the work (as 
discussed in chapter three) undercut the construction of privacy so that the viewer 
becomes implicated in the scene. A similar effect occurs in Killing where viewers also 
come upon a scene where they feel like intruders. Approaching the structure of Killing 
one feels as though they are observing a psychopath’s torture contraption from a horror 
film, or some kind of secret mechanism not meant for the public eye. Of course, as was 
discussed in chapter three in regard to Opera, this effect in Killing is circumvented by the 
presence of the desk and chair sitting directly in front of the machine. This vacant chair 
subtly implies that what is being conducted in the scene is meant for a witness, giving 
Killing a performative quality and, once again, implicating the viewer in the event. 
However, because this witness is, in fact, part of the performance, they become the 
inhuman, bearing witness to a space without memory.   
In Opera viewers become implicated because of the multiple perspectives from 
which they can observe the work. By observing Opera from the cutout at the back of the 
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structure, the effect of being on stage is produced. From the vantage point of the 
performer, indicated by the spotlighted chair, one looks out onto the audience via the 
large front window (fig.27). This effect of implication is further increased by the ways in 
which the viewer is called to participate in creating the work: piecing together and filling 
in the gaps provided by the audio portion of the work. As stated in chapter one, and 
further argued in chapter two, Opera calls upon the viewer to participate in the creation 
of the work by relying on their memory to provide a visual impression of the 
corresponding audio. This is important when we think about Lyotard’s reworking of the 
sublime. In the words of Carolyn Christov-Bakargiev, “We are constantly being made 
aware of events in which we are not participating. We worry about those that occur 
elsewhere, and we live them in a surrogate manner…Our bodies can be in one place 
while our minds are somewhere else.”105 However, Opera allows viewers to participate 
not only in a surrogate manner but directly—they are responsible for producing the 
images triggered by the audio and for piecing together the discontinuous and 
nonteleological narrative according to their individual formation.  
In order to further explore the problematization of teleology and narrative in 
Opera and Killing as they relate to the formation of new ideas about subjectivity, let us 
first consider the inhuman in the context of its discursive foils: the human and the 
posthuman. “The truth about stories is that’s all we are.”106 Thomas King’s quote from 
The Truth About Stories: A Native Narrative highlights the relationship between 
anthropology, storytelling, and narrative and their role in cultivating/informing the 
human. Historically speaking the question of the human was the central concern of the 
philosophy of humanism.107 In her book The Posthuman, Rosie Braidotti defines 
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humanism as: “a doctrine that combines the biological, discursive and moral expansion of 
human capabilities into an idea of teleologically ordained, rational progress.”108 This 
secular approach to humanism has been in development since the enlightenment period 
and can also be seen operating in the project of modernity, which seeks to unify various 
forms of human knowledge (epistemology) into grand universal narratives or 
mythologies.  
 The reaction to the paradigm of the human was the development of an anti-
humanist tradition, which came historically at a time when the Eurocentric and 
imperialist tendencies of humanism were being challenged.109 Braidotti traces the 1960s 
and 1970s anti-humanism tendencies to feminist, anti-racist, anti-nuclear, and pacifist 
political/social/cultural movements that arose around this time.110 In arguing for a more 
inclusive vision, these reactionary movements exposed the normative hegemony of the 
enlightenment-based ideals of humanism by revealing the exclusivity of the modern 
narrative. In giving voice to the excluded, these anti-humanist movements posited 
themselves as more representative of the whole. Despite its spirit of inclusion anti-
humanism falls prey to the same set of issues it problematizes: the replacement of a 
narrative is still a narrative. This is precisely why Opera does not provide an overarching 
narrative but instead calls upon the audience to piece together the events of the story. For 
story, as with the event, opposes assimilation by resisting totalization. As Christov-
Bakargiev continues: “[Cardiff’s work] evokes “personal” memories and narratives that 
are vague or sketchy enough to be anyone’s. The audience can partly create their own 
stories and project their own personal history onto the experience.”111 By requiring the 
viewer to participate directly in the creation of the work, without allowing them to 
narrativize this process, the viewer, in effect, becomes the subject of the work. This 
process of participation aids in evading the kinds of totalizing narratives produced by 
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humanism and instead produces a different kind of epistemological framework—one that 
operates around story.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 27: "Opera For a Small Room." Detail. View from rear window 
showing back of chair and megaphone. 
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In Killing, the viewer passes from the role of eavesdropper to participant the 
moment they press the button that engages the mechanism. However, this participation 
also implicates them in a crime: the torture and killing of the absent-present subject in the 
dental chair. But, once again, this implication is not straightforward because the killing 
itself is something that relies on the viewer in order to come into actuality or be present 
(fig.28 and fig.29). As McGinley describes her experience with another viewer during 
Cabin Fever: “We make eye contact but do not speak, a pair of guilty witnesses assuring 
mutual silence with a glance. But, we can say, quite honestly: I didn’t see anything.”112 
With Killing the viewer becomes implicated in a crime in which no one is actually 
harmed, as there is no subject in the dental chair. Thus, they didn’t see anything per se—
the event of the killing itself is not present spatially. Rather, viewers must attempt to 
present it to themselves temporally, which of course makes it unpresentable. Once again 
the viewer becomes the subject of the work, forcing their own demise. Viewers who are 
not directly responsible for pressing the button and act as bystanders are not exempt as 
they are implicated through in-action—they do nothing to stop the massacre. Even those 
who would attempt to turn the machine off are implicated because, in order to arrive at 
the decision to halt the mechanism, they would already had to have felt the impact of the 
killing, and thus would have already begun to present the demise of the subject in the 
chair to themselves. Reaching out to disengage the work, viewers realize that, once 
started, the mechanism is unresponsive. Drawing on their own memory to fill in the gaps 
and ultimately failing to present the unpresentable, the killing of a subject in the chair, the 
viewer must acknowledge their status as observer—a body watching on. This return to 
signification or cognition highlights that the sublime cannot be sustained. In this way, 
Killing and Opera demonstrate the temporal nature of subjectivity through the ways in 
which they shift the viewer through the roles of eavesdropper, participant, and observer, 
and point to the nature of these categories as temporal rather than spatial thus presenting 
viewers with the spatial lie of the subject through the loss of self in the sublime.   
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Figure 28: "The Killing Machine." Detail. Torture scene and stabbing of the absent-
present subject. 
Figure 29: "The Killing Machine." Detail. Torture scene wall shadow effect. 
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This spatial lie of the subjects in Opera and Killing also points out that their 
presence is fabricated temporally through the event. Because the man in the room in 
Opera and the subject in the dental chair in Killing both attain presence through their 
absence (they come into being through absence) they indicate that the viewer, as the 
subject of the work, also comes into being through absence. Connecting this back to the 
troubling of humanist notions in the Cardiff/Miller works, let us return to the response to 
the humanism–anti-humanism binary: posthumanism. Posthumanism is “the historical 
moment that marks the end of the opposition between Humanism and anti-humanism and 
traces a different discursive framework, looking more affirmatively towards new 
alternatives.”113 In other words, the posthuman can be seen as aligning itself with the 
postmodern project which, rather than creating grand universal narratives (mythos), aims 
to produce a different kind of epistemology along non-teleological lines. In rejecting the 
universality of an all-encompassing mythos, the postmodern marks the birth of the death 
of grand narratives. By using nonteleological stories the postmodern project presents 
itself as a singularity in a multiplicity, thereby repurposing narrative and metanarrative. 
The posthuman as the subject of the postmodern story marks a shift away from the 
purposive to the nonteleological. Rather than asking the modernist-humanist ontological 
questions: Where are we? Who are we? Why are we? the posthuman forces the more 
relevant question: When am I?—an ontological question of the subject as time-based. 
Thus, just as Cardiff and Miller’s works allow us to acknowledge the relationship of 
being to absent-presence and present-absence, so too does the question of the posthuman. 
Lyotard’s notion of the inhuman allows us to interrogate this line of thinking even 
further.  
As described earlier, the inhuman is the entity that bears witness to a space 
without memory or an event. The events of Opera and Killing are events without a 
memory for two reasons: First, as discussed in detail in chapter two, because the events 
of Opera and Killing are fictitious and come into being through their performance they 
become events without a memory; Second, and more importantly for our investigation in 
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this chapter, the viewer bears witness to a space without memory or an event by 
becoming the subject of the work. As the subject of the work, viewers effectively 
relinquish their subjectivity and give themselves over to objecthood—becoming matter. 
Trifonova maintains that “Lyotard’s idea of art making man present is based on his 
identification of presence with matter.”114 She continues by suggesting that this idea is in 
line with Bergson’s distinction between mind and matter: “Mind differs from matter 
thanks to its greater capacity for retention i.e. its capacity for memory. Matter does not 
retain any memories, it cannot experience repetition, and is free of inscription. In terms of 
time matter is the instant: matter does not exist in time for it is the very sensation of time. 
Thus, to be present, for Lyotard, is to be ‘matter’.”115 Rather than being a question of 
taking up space in an inert manner, matter is an event. Matter is present; it is the product 
of time itself. Opera and Killing, by making the viewer the subject of the work; by 
compelling the viewer to actively create the work through the use of memory; and by 
allowing one to be confronted with the fact that no memory is adequate, cause the viewer 
to become matter. By becoming matter the viewer then becomes the inhuman or the 
unpresentable as they are presented to themselves as matter—an event without a memory. 
In other words: “sublime art can hope to make man sense his being by reducing the 
human to the being of a material point, whose uniqueness does not endure.”116 By 
reducing the human to the inhuman, or the event, Cardiff and Miller’s work allows us to 
question what it means to be present, or have presence, as a subject or being.   
To further illustrate this process with an example from Opera it will be necessary 
to return to the idea of the re-actualization of the past in the present and its synthesis with 
the past as present, as put forth in chapter two. The perpetual remodification of the past in 
Opera occurs as the male voice recounts events from his present, or possibly his past, 
which converge with both the viewer’s present, and with their past. In an interview with 
David Balzer for Canadian Art magazine, Cardiff confirms that Opera is an allusion to 
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Samuel Beckett’s play, Krapp’s Last Tape, 1958.117 In Beckett’s work an elderly man 
sits alone in a room playing a tape recording created on his thirty-ninth birthday, of 
himself recounting various thoughts and memories. This scene is similar to the 
experience of looking at an old photograph of oneself, and knowing that this is a 
representation of the “I”, but not being able to locate or identify with this “I” in the 
present: you at once identify with and reject this representation as yourself. Krapp’s 
present is confused with his past and his future. He becomes matter with no memory to 
speak of. The effect that is created in Krapp is no doubt similar to that in Opera, where 
the anthropomorphic speaker narrates a story of a man who sits in a room (presumably 
the one in front of the viewer) reminiscing as he listens to old records. Towards the end 
of the piece, this absent-present man states, “He picks up his guitar and walks to the 
center of the stage. The audience waits anxiously. A voice is heard calling from the 
wings.”118 Here, viewers envision a man walking out into the center of the cluttered room 
holding a guitar, but can also envision themselves walking to the center of a stage 
watching the audience before them waiting anxiously. The experience of the subject of 
the story, and the experience of the viewer in the room, become one. As the narrator 
relays this action the past converges with the viewer’s present, the viewer past and the 
narrator’s present—all of which open onto a future that is a synthesis of these different 
times. What the viewer sees in front of them, in the wooden room with the records and 
the chandelier, is the affective resonance of a space that is not present physically but is 
present temporally. This time is part of the viewer’s present that relies on related 
memories to conjure an experience in the mind that is similar to what is being described. 
This memory is a time that is present temporally for both the viewer and the narrator, but 
is absent spatially. The viewer undergoes the same connection and disconnection that 
Krapp feels as he listens to the recording, but with an increased level of dislocation since 
these converging experiences, at once belong to the viewer but remain other. Both 
subjects, the viewer and the male subject of the narrative, undergo the ultimate loss of 
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self in this sublime separation of time from space—they become matter without memory, 
pure presence/present.  
In order to be fully presented with a sublime experience, once the viewer becomes 
inhuman, bearing witness to a space without memory, a pure presence/present, they must 
be drawn back into their role as an observer of the work. Opera does this through the use 
of sound that brings the viewer out of the story of the man on stage. After the male voice 
says: “A voice is heard calling from the wings,” a violin symphony loudly punctuates the 
silence and the viewer withdraws from their unconscious subliminal preoccupation and 
returns to consciousness.119 This instant demonstrates the dismantling of subjectivity at 
the moment of the sublime. As Kim-Cohen states: “The self-certainty of self-presence 
finds no purchase in this multiplication of time and identity because it relies on the 
impossibility of a return to the already impossible now.”120 In this passage, Kim-Cohen 
stresses that the unpresentable, or the sublime, is ungraspable as it exists beyond rational 
thought. The sublime presents a space without self-certainty or subjectivity—a space that 
is unpresentable because it is temporal.  Since the sublime both rejects and relies on 
cognitive structures it can only be maintained for an instant, meaning that the sublime 
necessarily avoids totalization. In the example from Opera, just as the viewer loses their 
sense of consciousness as they take on the role of the man on stage in the narration, 
bearing witness to an event, they are brought back from the sublime through the use of 
music.  
Due to the time-sensitive nature of the event, it resists unification, prohibiting 
consciousness from being able to account for it within experience. Trifonova sets out the 
problem as such: “Our consciousness has the capacity for synthesis because it is time-
consciousness: only that which is distended can be synthesized or totalized.”121 Given 
that the event itself happens in the instant, or the now, it resists totalization. Killing 
produces a similar effect that, as discussed earlier, is a result of the viewer becoming the 
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subject of the work, or the subject in the dental chair. Here, as discussed in greater detail 
in chapter two, the viewer identifies with the pain of the absent-present subject in the 
chair and, in doing so, takes on their role. However, just as the viewer is drawn into the 
sublime through their affective engagement with pain, assuming the position of the 
subject in the work, they are pulled back into their body through the punctuated sounds of 
the needles on the robotic arms, and the violin symphony that plays in the background, 
both of which trigger awareness. The push and pull relationship that the viewer maintains 
with their own subjective experience throughout both Opera and Killing emphasizes not 
only the failure of the imagination to present the event to the understanding, but also the 
failure of reason itself: “reason, too, fails to apprehend the occurrence: reason comes ‘too 
late’.”122 Reason arrives post-event as an attempt to comprehend what it cannot. Not only 
can the sublime not be totalized because it is not extended but, as with the case of Opera 
and Killing, there is no subject to totalize since the viewer, in coming to occupy the work 
itself, has become object.  This notion of subject becoming object in the face of the 
sublime is why the sublime raises questions of ontological significance for Lyotard. The 
inhuman asks one to consider how “the opposition subject-object loses relevance as it 
dissolves into the pre-ethical and pre-rational command: Be!”123 As the subject becomes 
object, exposing itself to the event “the postmodern sublime, by problematizing the very 
possibility of linking, establishes a necessity even more originary than the Kantian one. 
Linking to the aesthetic object and, in general, to what the mind is not, becomes an 
ontological law.”124 Thus, the inhuman, as produced by Opera and Killing, is presented 
as the entity that bears witness to a space without memory, or event, becoming an 
ontological category that allows us to interrogate the nature of the human as a rational 
animal.  
Considering the ways in which the viewer becomes matter, or the subject, in 
Opera and Killing, and the ways that both works effectively kill this subject at the end, 
why does the viewer endure? Given the ways in which the viewer becomes inhuman, 
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why does their subjectivity also endure? Killing comes to an end as the robotic arms have 
run their course of torture. After the subject in the dental chair has been stabbed 
sufficiently, the robotic arms begin to dance around in triumph (fig.30). As the violin 
music, which has served as the driving force of this act, comes to a close, the viewer 
becomes acutely aware that the absent-present subject has been killed. In Opera a similar 
outcome transpires. Toward the end of the work the narrator tells us: “The music doesn’t 
really change anything but it helps him in some way he doesn’t understand.”125 A short 
pause as the piano plays in the background and the voice continues: “It’s an opera after 
all, everyone dies in the end.”126 It is at this point that the narrator describes picking up 
his guitar and walking onto the stage, after which he returns to the story of the woman 
walking down the road with the shoes in her hands. As the music builds to a crescendo he 
sings to the guitar: “She was walking down the road with a dazed look on her face. They 
found her in the ditch. The car burst into flames.”127 At this line the viewer ascertains 
that there was some kind of car crash and, as the music gets more violent and the lights 
synchronize to the powerful climax of the rock orchestra, the accident and the wreckage 
really come alive. The narrator speaks, barely audible over the instruments, the music 
finally fading as he states: “Smudge marks on her face and the wind blew back her 
hair.”128 At this point the sound and lights slowly conclude followed by a brief silence 
and the subsequent sound of cheering and applause; this leaves the viewer with a number 
of questions. First, was it the male character that crashed the car, or perhaps the female? 
Has the male character died because the female character is described as walking? Or has 
she died and the man lives on to tell the tale of his regret and remorse? Perhaps it is both. 
One cannot be certain. However, since the viewer has inserted themselves into the roles 
of both subjects, they should also be dead but, of course, they are not; although it is an 
opera everyone does not die in the end, begging the question: Why?  
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Despite the acts of violence to subjectivity in Opera and Killing, the viewer 
endures due to the recuperation mechanism of the sublime. Lyotard’s concept of the 
inhuman allows us to explore this notion of recuperation in Opera and Killing further as 
it points to the idea that we never completely lose our subjectivity; we are not capable of 
getting past the subject entirely— even with the sublime, where subjectivity is suspended, 
there is a recuperation that always follows. Lyotard outlines the problem as follows: “All 
absolutes can only be thought, without any sensible/sensory intuition, as an Idea of 
reason, the faculty of presentation, the imagination, fails to provide a representation 
corresponding to this Idea. This failure of expression gives rise to a pain, a kind of 
Figure 30: "The Killing Machine." Detail. Robotic arms dancing in triumph. 
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cleavage within the subject between what can be conceived and what can be imagined or 
presented” which is why he later states that “the sublime is kindled by the threat of 
nothing further happening.”129 Thus, in order for the sublime to function as the 
unpresentable, self-awareness must occur after the moment of loss or failure; something 
must come to announce that everything is not over. However, at this moment of self-
awareness the sublime ceases to be. This is why, instead of positing itself after the human 
as with the posthuman, the inhuman is neither before nor after. Like the sublime it is a 
part of the now, thereby pointing to the nature of subjectivity as a temporal rather than 
spatial category. Even though Opera and Killing effect the death of the subject, the 
sublime fights back responding by preventing its complete demise. Kant’s notion of 
recuperation in the sublime, as considered in chapter two, is taken up by Lyotard in the 
form of his question: “is it happening?”130 In compelling viewers to ask themselves this 
question, Opera and Killing also allow us to acknowledge the impossibility of this 
consideration. As Lyotard maintains, “the mark of the question is ‘now’, now like the 
feeling that nothing might happen: the nothingness is now.”131 The now, of course, will 
always already elude our grasp—it is the unpresentable and as such, something must 
come in, something must happen. This is precisely why Lyotard continues: “Here and 
now there is this painting, rather than nothing, and that’s what is sublime. Letting go of 
all grasping intelligence and of its power, disarming it, recognizing that this occurrence 
of painting was not necessary and is scarcely foreseeable, a privation in the face of Is it 
happening?”132  The sublime response to the attempt towards the annihilation of the 
subject, presented in Opera and Killing, is to prevent this from happening by ultimately 
preserving subjectivity—arriving to announce that everything is not over.  
Opera and Killing bring the viewer to the brink, encouraging them to look out 
over the ledge. Right before the moment of death, however, they are brought back into 
signification, seemingly restored. Taking into consideration the nature of consciousness 
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as the vital component for human experience, eliminating it is unpresentable. The 
unpresentable according to Lyotard is:  
A ‘negative’ (Kant also says ‘abstract’) presentation…The sublime is not a 
pleasure, it is a pleasure of pain: we fail to present the absolute, and that is 
a displeasure, but we know that we have to present it, that the faculty of 
feeling or imagining is called on to bring about the sensible (the image). 
To present what reason can conceive, and even if it cannot manage to do 
this, and we suffer from this, a pure pleasure is felt from this tension.133  
Opera and Killing, in inviting the viewer to become inhuman by bearing witness to a 
space without memory, attempt to present the unpresentable, which of course is 
impossible. Rather, both of these works end up demonstrating the existence of a pre-
cognitive, pre-rational form of being. In order to show the existence of such a being, they 
must also allow us to return to what we have always known: the unlimited is always a 
product of the limited, and vice versa.  
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Concluding Remarks on Insides and Outsides 
Like Lyotard, and Kant before him, much of what I discuss in this thesis has 
constantly eluded my grasp. My ultimate challenge in trying to write about Opera and 
Killing has been that, in attempting to put forth a presentation of the sublime as 
present/presence that does not adhere to the tenants of either a modern or postmodern 
sublime, the now has ultimately confronted reason with its limitations: language. As 
Lyotard himself states, “Language is simply the most complex form of the (living and 
dead) ‘memories’ that regulate all living things and make them technical objects better 
adjusted to their surroundings.”134 Although we might valiantly try, language is 
something that is difficult to forget; for it persists in the simplest of places. Perhaps, 
however, forgetting language entirely is not the point that the sublime makes. At this 
point I would like to refer back to a passage from The Inhuman quoted in the first 
chapter: “I am not making this hypothesis about development my own, because it is a 
way, the way, for metaphysics, henceforth ruled out for thinking, to re-establish its rights 
over it. To re-establish them not within thinking (if I make an expectation of the thinking 
that still calls itself philosophical, which is to say metaphysical), but from the outside of 
thinking.”135 As was argued in this earlier chapter, and throughout the subsequent 
chapters, the sublime is simultaneously both within and outside experience as it both 
relies on and rejects normative structures: the failure of both the imagination and reason, 
or the function of the sublime as beyond reason, means that it is always followed by a 
higher form of recuperation. Thus, although the sublime is incomprehensible or 
unpresentable, something must happen, something must occur to announce that 
everything is not over. So the sublime is not just outside of language, it is also within.  
This last point opens up Lyotard’s discussion of metaphysics in the above 
passage, which is of interest here in our consideration of the vocabulary of inside and 
outside. While the use of these terms seemingly negates the argument regarding the 
despatialization of time that I have put forth in this thesis (they are of course spatial 
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metaphors), this terminology highlights two necessary points: 1) the sublime both rejects 
and relies on normative modes including language, thus it both rejects and relies on the 
spatialization of time; and 2) perhaps the more important point for our overall 
investigation: the vocabulary inside and outside relates to the question of metaphysics 
from Lyotard’s passage and underlies the very nature of my investigation. As outlined in 
the first chapter, the question central to my investigation here has been: How do artists 
present the unpresentable when presentation itself is impossible? This question has been 
answered historically in a variety of ways but most commonly, and in the Kantian 
context, the solution has been to separate the noumenal realm from the phenomenal. 
However, my investigation here, unlike Lyotard’s before me, attempts to get away from 
this distinction by asking how one can put forth the unpresentable in presentation itself 
without solving it by relying on something outside of the physical. I argue that the 
sublime answers this question by being both within and outside.  
Reading Cardiff and Miller’s works The Killing Machine and Opera for a Small 
Room as spaces without memory enables us to rethink the question of the sublime in 
terms of time, or present/presence, rather than spatiality. Thus, the sublime lies both 
inside and outside—meaning it is not a question of space but one of time. As Trifonova 
argues: “The attempt to redeem time from its subordination to space by traditional 
metaphysics is not the end of metaphysics but the beginning of a new kind of 
metaphysics, the metaphysics of immanence.”136 I would argue that Trifonova’s 
argument regarding time, and the re-opening of a new kind of metaphysics of immanence 
is perhaps even more complicated. The sublime exists both within and outside and neither 
because “time seems to be always already beyond the limits of comprehension and 
imagination: it is not even limited by the very category of ‘limit’ (itself a spatial 
category).”137 Trifonova uses Lyotard’s diction of the “limit” here, which as she points 
out is also a spatial metaphor. As Opera and Killing aptly show us, our ability to suspend 
these metaphors, to go beyond structures of thought, can only persist for mere moments 
of time.  
                                                
136 Trifonova, The Image in French Philosophy, 261.  
137 Ibid., 262.  
83 
 
What this investigation invites in terms of art historical potential, is of the utmost 
importance, especially for artists like Cardiff and Miller whose work deals with these 
very questions. My secondary objective in writing this thesis has been to show that the 
inquiry into issues of representation is one that has not yet ended. Historically, the 
sublime has been used as a placeholder for that which is not given within experience. The 
primacy of the sublime has not changed but it takes a different shape in the contemporary 
context with artworks like Cardiff and Miller’s. Works such as Opera and Killing, with 
their dynamic focus on the present, demonstrate the significance of the sublime. This 
reworking of Lyotard’s sublime highlights the notion that, “Lyotard’s sublime, as 
objectivist as it claims to be, rests on the premise that one can eclipse signification (the 
work of art should not signify or represent) by signifying existence as such (the work is 
sublime in the sense that it just ‘is’ and it also allows us to ‘be’).”138 Opera and Killing 
invite us to rethink the sublime as a space without memory precisely because, in bringing 
us into the present/presence, these works allow us to become matter, to be matter without 
memory. In so doing, they provide a means for us to understand that in order to enter the 
pre-cognitive and the pre-subjective we don’t need to forget, we simply need to 
acknowledge that there was never anything there in the first place.  
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